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Abstract 
Previous separate models of meaning in life have suggested that meaning is 
composed of several components operating across levels of construal. For 
example, sometimes people might look to a component of meaning in a state of 
concrete construal to gain a sense of consistency or predictability, and at other 
times they may look to a component of meaning to create feelings of higher 
purpose in life. These models of meaning have the potential to shed light not only 
on the various facets of life that make people feel life is meaningful, but to 
discover the ways in which these components create feelings of meaning in terms 
of both predictability as well as purpose. These models also have great potential 
for understanding the ways in which people compensate for threats to meaning at 
different levels of construal. The goal of the present investigation was to test the 
idea that people experience meaning at both concrete and abstract levels of 
construal, and to assess which types of standards create meaning in live most 
effectively. Specifically, I tested the hypothesis that morality may be especially 
effective at creating feelings of both predictability and purpose more effectively 
than convention. In addition, the present research examined whether or not 
morality is especially effective at compensating for threats to feelings of 
predictability and higher purpose compared to convention for these same reasons.                 
 These ideas were tested in three studies. In Study 1, participants rated the 
extent to which two types of standards, conventional standards and moral 
standards, provide a sense of predictability (i.e. “coherence”) and a sense of 
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purpose (i.e. “transcendence”). In Study 2, participants completed a construal 
level manipulation designed to induce states of concrete or abstract construal and 
then rated the extent to which conventional and moral standards provide 
consistency and purpose. In a third study, participants completed a faux 
personality inventory and received false feedback suggesting they would live a 
life characterized by either low or average levels of either predictability 
(coherence) or purpose (transcendence).  
 The results of Study 1 demonstrated that participants found more 
coherence and transcendence in their moral standards compared to their 
conventional standards. In addition, moral standards provided much more 
transcendence than conventional standards, whereas morality created slightly 
more coherence than conventional standards. The results of Study 2 showed no 
effects, and the results of Study 3 demonstrated that participants found their moral 
standards to be much more important to them than their conventional standards. 
 The overall results of all three studies suggest that people see their moral 
standards as providing more meaning in life, especially in the form of 
transcendence, than their conventional standards. The results also suggest that 
moral standards are generally more important to people than conventional 
standards. Overall, these results suggest that people may be able to experience a 
broader sense of purpose in life by focusing on moral standards.           
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Introduction 
It has been argued that the central motivating factor behind all scientific, 
philosophical, literary, and artistic endeavors is the pursuit of meaning in life 
(Camus, 1955; Frankl, 1963, Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Meaning in life is 
important to human beings, and higher levels of meaning in life are related to 
increased wellbeing (Antonovski, 1993; Ryff, 1989) and an enhanced ability to 
cope with unexpected or difficult life-circumstances (Park & Folkman, 1997; Zika 
& Chamberlain, 1992). Philosophers (e.g. Camus, 1955) as well as psychologists 
(Heine, Proulx & Vohs, 2006) suggest that meaning is a core motivating force in 
human life, and that a life without meaning may not seem worth living at all. 
Hence, it is important to examine how meaning in life is most effectively created 
and protected. 
  Psychologists have examined factors that allow people to both create and 
defend their sense of meaning in life. One prominent model of meaning, the 
Meaning Maintenance Model (Heine et al., 2006), proposes that a number of 
factors (i.e. “components”) contribute to a sense of meaning in life. These 
components include certainty, belonging, self-esteem, and feelings of symbolic 
immortality. According to meaning maintenance theorists, meaning is a sense of 
consistency between beliefs, expectations, and events, and the presence of any 
one of the components of meaning constitutes a marker of meaning in life.  
  Other theorists (e.g., Steger, 2012; Wong, 2012) have examined meaning 
in terms of its ability to create not only feelings of consistency, but of purpose. 
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These theorists suggest that people seek meaning to feel that the environment is 
consistent and predictable, and also to feel that there is a greater purpose to life 
than what occurs in predictable day-to-day living. These theorists suggest that 
consistency is indeed important when it comes to creating a sense of meaning in 
life, but that people also want to believe in an overall reason for living in the first 
place (Wong, 2012). 
 Meaning and its Two Dimensions 
  Meaning has been defined as mental representations of relationships 
among people, events, and things (Bruner & Postman, 1949; Heine et al., 2006), a 
sense of coherence concerning one’s environment, self, group, and roles 
(Antonovski, 1979; Battista & Almond, 1973; Heine, Proulx & Vohs, 2006) and 
the web of connections, understandings, and interpretations that help us 
comprehend our experience and formulate plans (Baumeister, 1991; Steger, 2012). 
Meaning has also been referred to as goal directedness and purposefulness 
(Klinger, 1977; Ryff & Singer, 1988), the ultimate purpose of life (Steger, 2012a) 
and a sense that one’s individual life (Yalom, 1980), and life in general, has 
purpose (Park, 2010; Steger, 2012a; Steger, Frasier, Oishi & Kaler, 2006; Ryff, 
1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998).  
 Within these definitions of meaning, there seem to be two overarching 
themes. Some researchers seem to suggest that meaning is based on congruence 
between expectations and outcomes (e.g., Heine et al., 2006; Proulx, 2013). These 
researchers suggest that meaning threats are the result of incongruence and 
violated expectations (Somerville, Heatherton, & Kelly, 2006), and that meaning 
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is created by a sense of consistency between the internal and external 
manifestations of important areas of life. Recent meaning theorists (Heine et al., 
2006) suggest that consistency can be created through a variety of components, 
such as certainty, belonging, self-esteem, and symbolic immortality. For example, 
a person might create a sense of meaning by focusing on the certainty of their 
beliefs and acting in accordance with them. A person might also find meaning by 
gaining the acceptance of a group, by seeing oneself positively after doing a good 
deed, or by engaging in actions that enable them to feel that their deeds in life will 
benefit future generations. Overall, recent theory about meaning in life suggests 
that behaving in ways that create, and are consistent with, desires for certainty, 
belonging, self-esteem, and symbolic immortality, create feelings of meaning in 
life. Based primarily on this perspective, I will use certainty, belonging, views of 
the self (e.g., self-esteem), and symbolic immortality to represent the construct of 
meaning in life throughout the remainder of this paper.     
  Aside from perspectives suggesting that meaning is created primarily 
through consistency, other theorists (e.g., Arndt et al., 2013; Steger, 2012; Wong, 
2012) suggest that meaning operates in terms of “micro and “macro” level 
representations. This perspective suggests that meaning in the form of micro 
representations is concerned with how people deal with the immediate 
environment, and macro representations of meaning are concerned with 
relationships between life events that represent their overall value or purpose 
(Arndt et al., 2013; Steger, 2012). These theorists suggest that people pursue 
micro and macro level meaning for different reasons. For example, people might 
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look to micro level meanings, like environmental predictability, for survival value, 
and they may look to macro levels of meaning, like cultural values, to feel that 
there is an ultimate reason for living, and perhaps to even transcend the fear of 
death (Steger 2012; Wong, 2012). 
  In response to these overarching perspectives of the meaning construct, 
Wetherell (unpublished manuscript) developed the Integrated Model of Meaning. 
This model states that people can experience meaning by focusing on any of the 
components proposed by meaning maintenance theorists in states of concrete or 
abstract construal. More specifically, the model proposes that people can 
experience meaning both concretely, at its micro level, and abstractly, at its macro 
level. This new framework takes into account the perspective that meaning is 
created through consistency (Heine et al., 2006), and allows for various 
components of meaning to operate at low or high levels of abstraction (i.e., 
construal). This integration of the meaning literature accounts for the multiple 
constructs that give life meaning at both higher and lower levels of abstraction.  
  According to the Integrated Model of Meaning (Wetherell, unpublished 
manuscript), components of meaning are construed concretely to create a sense of 
“coherence” which is meaning based on a sense of predictability and safety. 
Meaning can also be construed abstractly to focus on and fulfill the need for 
“transcendence” or greater purpose in life, a type of meaning dealing not only 
with predictability and safety, but searching for a reason to live at all. For 
example, a person might feel meaningful because they are protected by society (a 
low level construal of meaning creating coherence). Alternatively, people may 
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experience meaning because they feel that they have fulfilled the goals in line 
with their cultural values or have contributed to a cause greater than themselves. 
The Integrated Model of Meaning examines coherence and transcendence in 
detail and makes predictions about their specific functions.  
  Coherence. Coherence is concerned with the struggle for predictability, 
consistency, and safety. People want to create consistency between expectations 
and outcomes (e.g. Antonovski, 1987; Bruner & Postman, 1949; Heine, et al., 
2006) to help them predict and control life circumstances (Heine, et al., 2006; 
Peacock & Reker, 1982; Steger, 2009; 2012a; White, 1959). For example, people 
can create feelings of consistency within the self through the perception that 
following the guidelines provided by belief systems affects actual outcomes 
(Heine et al., 2006; Steger, 2012).  
  In line with the idea that coherence is geared towards meeting immediate 
survival goals, the Integrated Model of Meaning suggests that coherence is 
construed concretely, as concrete construal is related to more narrowed goal 
pursuit and focus compared to abstract construal (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; 
Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009). Concrete construal is a state in which people 
focus on the immediate environment. This immediate focus can occur temporally 
by leading people to focus on the near future as opposed to the distant future 
(Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003), spatially by leading people 
to focus on and think about objects that are physically close compared to distant 
objects (Trope & Liberman, 2010), socially when people look for similarities 
rather than differences (Trope & Liberman, 2010) and hypothetically, by 
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impacting whether or not people think things are likely to occur in the near 
(concrete) or distant (abstract) future (Liberman & Trope, 1998). When a person 
is attempting to make sense of an immediate and potentially confusing situation, 
they may shift to a state of concrete construal to examine the specifics of the 
situation at hand across temporal, spatial, social, or hypothetical dimensions. In 
support of this idea, some theory and research suggests that people who live in 
harsh and unpredictable environments tend to operate predominantly in states of 
concrete construal to help attend to immediate concerns in the environment 
(White, 2010). 
Is certainty necessary for coherence? To the extent that coherence is a 
sense of consistency, predictability, and safety, one might think that certainty is a 
prerequisite for creating a sense of coherence. This may or may not be the case. 
Coherence by definition represents a sense that one can predict and potentially 
control the environment. In order to make predictions and affect outcomes one 
must be relatively sure of causal relationships between objects in the environment 
and the way in which one’s actions will affect outcomes. Based on this line of 
reasoning one might conclude that one must be certain of the relation between 
things to feel coherence. 
This need for certainty may also carry over into the way in which self-
esteem, belonging, and symbolic immortality provide coherence. The integrated 
model of meaning suggests that components of meaning other than certainty may 
also create consistency, predictability, and a sense of safety, but it may be 
possible that certainty is built into these components at the level of coherence. For 
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example, belonging may provide a sense of social cohesion and allow people to 
feel that they will be taken care of by those who appreciate them. It is hard to 
conceive of a situation in which a person feels uncertain about their belonging yet 
feels that they know how people will react to them and knows that society will 
protect them. Hence, at the level of coherence, certainty may be a core factor, and 
may be inextricably bound up with the remaining components of meaning.  
On the other hand, there may be circumstances in which a person can feel 
a sense of coherence and yet still feel uncertain about things. For example, a 
scientist may feel that the universe is coherently organized through physical laws 
that can be expressed mathematically, but admit to being uncertain about all the 
inner workings of the universe. As of yet, the integrated model of meaning makes 
no explicit prediction or statement about whether or not certainty is required for a 
sense of coherence, and as such, this issue is beyond the scope of the experiments 
presented here.    
 Transcendence. Transcendence, the second dimension of meaning in life, 
is the sense that one’s life has an ultimate purpose. Transcendence is the 
dimension of meaning representative of what previous researchers have called 
“self-transcendence” (Peacock & Reker, 1982; Reker, 1991)  “global belief 
systems” (Janolf-Bulman, 1992), “meaningfulness” or “significance” (Prat & 
Ashforth, 2003), and an approach system of meaning (Wong, 2012). The sense of 
purpose represented by transcendence is the dimension of meaning most 
associated with the lay understanding of meaning (Park, 2010; Steger, 2012; 
Steger, Frasier, Oishi & Kaler, 2006; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998). In 
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contrast to coherence, transcendence enables people to feel that their lives are 
more than just the sum of individual experiences and that there is an ultimately 
meaningful reason to live (Wong, 2008). Transcendence also encompasses 
broader spiritual matters concerned with group life, self worth, and the purpose 
and care of humanity as a whole (Mascaro, Rosen, & Morey, 2004; Reker, 2000).  
In contrast to coherence, transcendence is construed abstractly to allow 
one to take an “aerial” view of their life circumstances and to search for and 
understand their life purpose. People shift to abstract construal when they want to 
understand significant life events (Forster, 2009; Trope & Liberman, 2010). For 
example, abstract construal increases the ease with which people piece together 
causal sequences (Helzer & Edwards, 2012), and people prompted to think in 
abstract compared to concrete terms feel they better understand the overall cause 
or purpose of events (Namkoong & Henderson, 2013). Transcendence, in contrast 
to coherence, allows people to piece together constellations of relationships 
between circumstances and events representing the overall reason for their 
occurrence. Overall, people who experience feelings of both safety and 
predictability (i.e., coherence) and purpose (i.e., transcendence) are most fulfilled 
(Peacock & Reker, 1982; Reker, 1991; Steger, 2009; 2012; Wong, 2012). 
The margins between coherence and transcendence. The proposition that 
meaning operates across dimensions of construal (i.e. coherence and 
transcendence) suggests that there should be instances in which coherence and 
transcendence are related to one another. For example, to the extent that a person 
feels that there is a transcendent meaning to their life, they may cultivate a sense 
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of coherence in even the most chaotic of situations. In such a case a person would 
experience a strong relation between coherence and transcendence. The integrated 
model of meaning also proposes that transcendence may compensate for, and thus 
be related to coherence to a greater extent than coherence compensates for and is 
related to transcendence.  
In spite of this, some thinkers, such as the romantic philosophers (Kant, 
1914) suggest that a sense of coherence is a launch pad to the absolute, thus 
providing a hint that some people may first build a sense of coherence and this 
sense may help them to feel transcendent. Psychological theorists, such as 
Maslow (1943), propose models that are suggestive of this process. For example, 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs suggests that people first seek physical safety before 
trying to reach their full potential and purpose, a state called “self-actualization”. 
This provides an example of a situation in which coherence and transcendence 
should be highly related. 
The integrated model of meaning does not suggest, however, that 
coherence and transcendence are identical constructs, so there should also be 
instances in which coherence and transcendence are not related at all. Some 
people may have absolutely no need to feel that their lives mean something, but 
have a strong need to feel predictability and physical comfort. Such a 
circumstance may arise with a hedonistic orientation in which a person cares only 
for creature comforts. For such a person, coherence will have no relation to 
transcendence and would not provide a manner to create transcendence.  
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Standards of Behavior  
  There may be different ways that people create meaning in life across 
dimensions of construal. People may create meaning through social conventions, 
or standards of relative social conduct adopted by groups of people to coordinate 
action (Nucci & Turiel, 1978) and create feelings of predictability in a specific 
situation (i.e., coherence). Additionally, people may adhere to conventional 
standards to fulfill a higher-level (i.e., transcendent) goal, like ensuring the safety 
of society. In contrast to conventional standards, people may also look to moral 
standards (sets of beliefs and value representing what a persons feels is absolutely 
right or wrong; Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005) to create a sense of meaning at 
high and low levels of construal as well.    
Conventional standards. One way a person might create structure and 
consistency is by following conventional standards (i.e., social conventions), 
which are norms commonly followed in a society (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Skitka, 
Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Social conventions are expectations people adhere to in 
order to create a common set of standards to abide by, but are not seen as 
reflecting what is absolutely right or wrong. For example, some societies might 
eat dinner late at night and some might eat dinner in the early evening. Because 
conventional standards are relative, a person moving to a separate country will 
often spontaneously adopt the conventions of their new nation as a matter of 
course. For example, a person in the United States who is used to eating with a 
fork might adopt local conventions in Japan and eat with chopsticks, or drive on 
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the left side of the road in the United Kingdom. This characteristic of 
conventional standards suggests that whether a person follows conventional 
standards depends on the mandates of social norms or authority figures (Nucci & 
Turiel, 1978). In other words, conventional standards are externally imposed and 
are descriptive of the way that people are expected to relate to one another in a 
given environment (Kohlberg, 1984, Selman, 1980). Such ideas suggest that 
conventional standards are post-social (Durkheim, 1925/1973; Turiel, 2006).   
Just as social conventions depend on the mandates of authority or social 
norms, they are not experienced as objective or universal (Turiel, 2006). This 
means that conventions are seen as subjective (and sometimes arbitrary), although 
they are often put in place to provide order (Nucci & Turiel, 1976; Smetana, 
1984). Thus, when people experience a standard as conventional they may see it 
as serving a function, but are willing to substitute other behaviors that serve the 
same purpose. For example, people in the United States abide by traffic laws and 
stop at red lights. However, if new laws were enacted so that drivers had to stop at 
purple lights, they would adapt. Such a situation indicates that feelings about the 
color of traffic signals are based on conventional standards, as they are subjective 
and imposed by social norms and lawmakers to create order. This means that 
people feel that conventional standards apply only in the context of a given 
society or situation. If society was to break down or needed to change, people 
would change their conventional standards. For these reasons, there may be limits 
to the sense of structure and predictability that conventional standards create. In 
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unfamiliar contexts, people may become confused about what is conventional, 
and need to look to the behavior of others as a model for their own.  
Because conventional standards are externally imposed, people often do 
not feel strong emotions directed at others when others violate conventional 
standards (Smetana, 1984). For example, it is convention to follow specific sets of 
table manners in Western countries. In the United States and most parts of Europe, 
people eat with spoons, forks, and knives, but not with their fingers. If people in 
Western countries see someone from another country eat with their fingers, they 
will most likely not experience any strong emotional reaction, and will not blame 
the person violating convention for their actions, particularly if they believe the 
other person does not know the local customs. In addition, if people were to 
experience an emotional reaction (e.g., revulsion) when seeing a person eating 
with their fingers, they probably would not be revolted by the person, but revolted 
in general in response to seeing something considered unhygienic or messy. In 
instances such as these, it is also possible that people will be angry with someone 
who violates convention, but not because there is something innately wrong with 
eating with one’s fingers-it simply violates an agreed-upon social standard. If the 
rules were changed such that eating with fingers was convention, people would 
not become angry at others for eating with their fingers. 
A note about personal preferences. Before continuing on to an analysis 
of moral standards, I think that it is important to examine a second, as of yet 
unmentioned type of social standard – personal preference. I do not include 
personal preferences in the current investigation for theoretical reasons, and feel it 
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is important to describe why this is the case in the context of the extant literature 
on behavioral standards. It is important to make a distinction between 
conventional standards and personal preferences. Personal preferences are 
subjective preferences that individuals have but, in contrast to conventional 
standards, preferences are not socially regulated (Nucci 2001; Turiel, 2002). For 
example, one person might prefer vanilla ice cream to chocolate ice cream. There 
is no law, norm, or social standard stating or tacitly implying that a person should 
prefer vanilla to chocolate ice cream. In addition, it is extremely unlikely that a 
person with such a preference would believe that all people should prefer vanilla 
to chocolate ice cream, that such a preference should be present across all 
situations, that it represents what is objectively right or wrong, and that seeing a 
person eats chocolate ice cream would spark anger and disgust. In addition, in 
contrast to conventional standards, personal preferences are not socially regulated. 
From this example, we can see that personal preferences are not seen as objective 
and universal, nor are they associated with strong emotions towards people who 
do not adhere to them.  
In the context of the present research, I do not examine preferences 
because I do not think that they should have the same ability to provide meaning 
as conventional standards. Conventional standards are shared by people and 
communities, which may make them more capable of creating a sense of certainty 
and predictability across situations. Preferences should not provide as much 
predictability because one’s personal preferences do not give a person an idea of 
how others will behave. People may also derive a sense of belonging by adhering 
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to the conventions of their social group, and may feel good about themselves if 
they adhere correctly to conventional standards. It is unlikely that one will 
experience a strong bond with a community of vanilla iced cream eaters and 
derive a sense of pride from eating one’s preferred ice cream.  
Not all standards are relative like conventional standards and personal 
preferences, however, and some standards are experienced as less mutable than 
conventional standards. Moral standards constitute such a type of standard. 
Moral standards. In addition to conventional standards, people adhere to 
moral standards (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 1976; Skitka et al., 2005) that are 
experienced as objective, universal, and indicative of what is absolutely right or 
wrong. In other words, moral standards have prescriptive and proscriptive 
characteristics (Kohlberg, 1984, Selman, 1980), and are based on value judgments 
about how people should behave. If a person experiences a standard as moral, 
they see it as applicable to all situations and societies regardless of the situation or 
what the society in question holds to be true. For example, a person with moral 
beliefs about abortion (e.g., a belief that it is wrong) will see abortion as wrong 
across all societies regardless of particular social laws or customs. Evidence for 
this proposition comes from domain theorists (e.g., Turiel, 2006) who find that 
children are willing to defy authority figures (e.g., teachers) when they are told to 
do something they consider morally wrong, such as hitting another child. The 
same researchers find that children are compliant with orders to adhere to social 
conventions such as waiting in line, or sitting, as opposed to standing, while 
eating a snack. These findings suggest that moral standards are held 
	   17	  
independently of social norms and the mandates of authority figures, and seen as 
objective and universal. Because of the objectivity and universality of moral 
standards, people may experience them as a powerful source of consistency and 
predictability, potentially to an even greater extent than they experience social 
conventions. Furthermore, the objective and universal characteristics of moral 
standards may create feelings of consistency and predictability across situations to 
a greater extent than conventional standards, which are experienced relatively. 
Whereas people attempting to interpret how to behave in a specific situation based 
on conventional standards may sometimes become confused or uncertain, one’s 
moral standards may provide absolute guides for behavior across all situations 
and social contexts. 
In addition to being independent of authority and experienced as objective 
and universal, moral standards are associated with strong emotions such as anger 
and disgust when their moral standards are violated (Mullen & Skitka, 2006) and 
that people experience these emotions towards specific moral violators (Tetlock, 
2002; Tetlock et al., 2000). For example, if a person believes that abortion is 
wrong, and they are in a country where abortion is legal, they will see those who 
get abortions as immoral and feel strong negative emotions (e.g., anger and 
disgust) towards them in spite of abortion’s legality. This suggests that moral 
standards differ from conventional standards because they are accompanied by 
strong negative emotions towards those who violate moral sensibilities. Because 
of the strong emotions that accompany the violation moral standards may provide 
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a greater and more immediate sense of certainty about what the correct behaviors 
are in any situation. 
Overall, and in contrast to conventional standards, moral standards are 
experienced as objective and universal and as applicable to all situations and 
social contexts. Moral standards are authority independent, meaning that people 
adhere to their moral standards even when there are legal and social consequences 
for doing so, and will often shirk the mandates of authority follow their moral 
standards. When people see someone violate their moral standards, they 
experience strong negative emotions towards that person. 
Theorists and researchers have struggled to understand the processes 
through which an issue becomes moral. For example, the philosopher David 
Hume (1777/1960) suggested that people are able to use reason to ascertain 
whether or not an act will harm others, but caring for others is necessary to 
produce a moral judgment. Kohlberg (1971) posited that children begin their lives 
as egoists, only avoiding behavior if they think it will be punished, and later 
develop the ability to take the perspective of others. These perspectives suggest, at 
least in part, that reason and logical thought drive judgments and moral feelings 
about the acts of others. On the contrary, modern social psychologists (Haidt, 
2001; Nucci & Turiel, 1978) suggest that some acts, such as harm, elicit powerful 
emotions that predate moral reason, and are sensed as innately immoral.  
There is still much work to be done to understand the process through 
which beliefs become moralized. Based on the above citations, it could be the 
case that people learn moral standards from authority figures and then internalize 
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them, creating a sense of objectivity and universal morality. Once this sense of 
objectivity and universality is established, a standard become moralized, and thus 
authority independent and resistant to change. It could also be the case however, 
that people are born with an innate moral sense, and that this moral sense guides 
behavior from the outset, leading them to defy authorities when it comes to their 
moral beliefs.  
 In the current work, I examine standards of behavior (conventional and 
moral) based on the assumption that participants have already established 
conventional and moral standards in their own lives that they can think about, feel 
strongly, and act upon. Thus, within the current framework, I define moral 
standards as authority independent, and conventional standards as authority 
dependent, although it may be the case that some standards are first experienced 
as conventional and become moral later on, or that some standards are 
experienced as moral innately.  
It is often the case that people speak about their morals in tandem with 
their religious beliefs. To create greater conceptual clarity and to avoid conflating 
moral and religious standards, it is important to turn briefly to a description of 
how moral and religious standards are different from one another.     
Are moral standards and religious beliefs identical constructs? It is 
important to examine whether or not moral standards are different not only from 
conventional standards but from religious standards. One might argue based on 
social observation that religious beliefs are almost always experienced as moral 
standards as well, but research does not support this idea. The extant literature on 
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religion and morality is more supportive of the view that there is often overlap 
between religious and moral beliefs within people, but religion and moral beliefs 
do not overlap completely; they are still distinct constructs. For example, domain 
theorists (Nucci & Turiel, 1993) asked members of Mennonite and Jewish 
congregations whether or not acts characterized as moral (e.g., stealing, hitting, 
slander, and property damage) would be justified if God said they were okay. The 
large majority of people in these congregations stated that these acts would be 
morally wrong even if God said they were permissible, suggesting that what 
people experience as morally and religiously justified is not always the same. 
Conversely, they found that issues they characterized as non-moral and based 
solely on religious conventions (e.g., interfaith marriage, working on the Sabbath) 
were seen as acceptable to change with God’s permission, and almost universally 
acceptable for other religious groups to bypass. These results suggest that moral 
beliefs often exist independently from religious beliefs, and what people 
experience as moral is experienced as immutable across situations regardless of 
its religious context. In addition, this research suggests that conventional 
standards associated with religious doctrine are experienced as flexible, as is the 
case in religions such as Catholicism in which religious authorities may change 
what is customary (e.g., not eating meat on Friday).      
Similarly, moral conviction researchers have found that moral conviction 
predicts outcomes such as trust in authority figures (Skitka, Bauman & Lytle, 
2009; Wisneski, Lytle & Skitka, 2009) while controlling for religious conviction. 
It is notable that religious conviction and moral conviction can even predict trust 
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in authority in opposite directions, with moral conviction predicting decreased 
trust in authority to make proper decisions about moral issues, and religious 
conviction relating to greater trust in authorities to make the same decisions. 
These findings mirror those of the domain theorists and go one step further and 
demonstrate that morality is authority-independent to a greater extent than both 
religious beliefs and conventional standards.  
This is not to say that no religious beliefs are experienced as moral or that 
all religious beliefs are conventional. For example, Nucci and Turiel (1993) found 
that some congregation members did say that they would not object to stealing if 
God told them to. They came to this conclusion based on the grounds that divine 
authority trumps terrestrial morals, even if people do not understand or like God’s 
decisions. Also, these same researchers found that many congregation members 
would still continue the conventions of their religion without the directive of God, 
and a small number even said they think the conventions of their religions 
generalize to those of other faiths. These results suggest that some people may 
experience an issue as a part of their religious beliefs but not their moral standards 
(or vice versa), and that others may experience the same issue as a moral and 
religious standard as neither a moral nor religious standard. This idea is in line 
with modern moral theorists (e.g., Skitka, 2010) who take a ideographic (within 
person) approach to morality that allows for flexibility within the individual 
regarding whether or not an issue is moral, conventional, religious, or some 
combination of the three.  
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Conventional and Moral Standards Provide Meaning 
Overall, both conventional and moral standards may provide feelings of 
consistency and predictability, and also higher purpose in life. A person seeking 
purpose might look to conventional standards to explanation why we are here on 
earth (e.g., we are here to make sure the species proliferates). Moral standards 
may also provide people with codes to live by that not only provide order, but that 
imbue life with feelings of ultimate purpose.  
In addition to differing in objectivity, universality, authority independence, 
and emotional strength, moral and conventional standards may be experienced 
either in concrete or abstract states of mind. People should experience their moral 
standards as immutable no matter what level of construal they operate under 
because moral standards, by definition, are seen as representing what is absolutely 
right or wrong. However, people might experience their morals at low levels of 
construal pertaining to specific situations, with no overarching set of values or 
ideas guiding them, or at high levels of construal, seeing their morals as driving a 
wide variety of situations based on a set of universal values. Similarly, 
conventions should be seen as relative, as they do not represent absolute right or 
wrong, but conventions may also operate at low levels of construal, with people 
following convention for no reason (e.g., driving on the right as opposed to the 
left side of the road) or based on broader goals (e.g., eating with plastic chopsticks 
to decrease wood usage). Overall, moral and conventional standards should retain 
their defining characteristics at any level of abstraction, but the level of construal 
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at which a person experiences conventional and moral standards may color how 
they perceive these standards, and maybe even have implications for how such 
standards provide meaning. It is therefore important to examine how conventional 
and moral standards may operate across the dimensions of coherence and 
transcendence. 
 Conventional standards provide coherence. Conventional standards 
may be a source of predictability and consistency in day-to-day life because they 
describe social expectations. People frequently abide by conventional standards as 
a template of behavior to follow in a given situation, even very simple situations 
at low levels of construal. At a dinner party, for example, a person may use a 
specific dinner fork to eat a meal and pass food clockwise around the table 
because it is a conventional standard that enables people to collectively coordinate 
their behavior. Such conventional standards may create coherence because they 
enable consistent and predictable patterns of behavior. However, in such a case, 
there is no reason other than that it is a conventional standard to use the fork in 
question, or pass the dishes in one direction compared to another. That is, these 
conventional standards are arbitrary. If someone were to use a slightly bigger fork 
or begin passing the dishes counterclockwise, it is doubtful that anyone would 
truly mind, and people may even adapt to the new behavior.  
 This example contains several ways in which conventional standards 
construed concretely can provide coherence. By establishing a clear set of norms 
for silverware use and plate passing, the guests are able to know which way to 
coordinate their behavior so that everyone efficiently received food and are able 
	   24	  
to consume it properly. In addition, conventional standards also allow the guests 
to establish a sense of consistency in their environment by providing a set of 
guidelines to follow at all dinner parties, without any need to inquire about what 
is proper. 
 Conventional standards provide transcendence. Conventional standards 
may also be experienced at higher levels of construal. Some theorists (e.g., 
Sheppard & Cushman, 2010) suggest that people hold conventional standards 
with both low and high levels of abstraction. Specifically, these researchers 
suggest that people can see social conventions not only in low-level black and 
white terms but also as aspirations to live up to. However, as is the case with 
conventional standards in general, abstract conventional standards may not be 
seen as absolutely necessary or mandatorily upheld. An example from the 
literature is that lawyers are encouraged to serve 50 hours of pro-bono legal work 
per year by the bar association with the overarching, abstract goal of increasing 
service work in the legal professions (Sheppard & Cushman, 2010). However, this 
is not mandatory, and different attorneys experience varied levels of commitment 
to this ideal. Many lawyers see the 50 hour pro-bono time commitment as 
laudable, but do not feel personally compelled to complete it, nor do they feel 
badly about themselves if they do not live up to it, or angry or disgusted with 
others for not reaching this goal. Another illustrative example, based on the dinner 
party scenario above, would be a case in which people use proper silverware and 
pass dishes counterclockwise, but for a different reason than social coordination; 
to show their appreciation for their hosts and the other guests at the table. In this 
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situation the guests at the dinner party abide by a convention construed abstractly 
(i.e. a transcendent convention) with the goal of honoring the home of another. 
 From these examples, we can see that transcendent conventional standards 
are similar in some ways to coherent conventional standards, but there are 
differences between conventional standards across levels of construal. As is the 
case with coherent conventional standards, transcendent conventional standards 
are externally imposed. In the case of a dinner party, most people use specific 
silverware and pass plates in specific ways because it has been established by 
others as conventional, If an authoritative institution (e.g. the association for 
silverware usage and plate movement directionality) were to change the rules, it 
seems quite likely that most people would change their dinner etiquette. In 
contrast to the concretely construed convention of passing food in a specific 
direction around the table, however, a person might do so to honor their hosts and 
other guests. This transcendent conventional standard is also not experienced as 
objective or universal, and if there were another way to behave that would fulfill 
this same function, a person experiencing their dinner etiquette as convention 
would be willing to change their behavior. Even if transcendent conventional 
standards are not experienced with the same objectivity and universality as moral 
standards, the overarching reasoning behind such conventions may instill people 
with a sense of purpose when they abide by them.  
 Based on the theoretical perspective proposed above, it seems that 
conventional standards can operate at both low and high levels of construal. 
Whether or not a person follows conventional standards because it is what is 
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arbitrarily expected by society, or because they have an overarching goal or 
purpose in mind, conventional standards are not held with a sense of objectivity 
and universality across all situations, nor do they operate independently of 
authority or evoke strong emotions towards violators of conventional standards.  
Moral Standards Provide Meaning  
Most if not all people have beliefs and intuitions about themselves, their 
ideologies and their actions, that they think are reflective of what is universally 
right or wrong (Haidt, 2001; Skitka et al., 2005). Viewing life through the lens of 
one’s moral standards may be very effective at providing coherence, 
transcendence, or both. Initial support for the idea that moral standards provide 
coherence and transcendence comes from philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, 
who suggests that moral laws reside in a higher, “supersensible” realm in which 
truth resides (Kant, 1914). Kant stated that two things fill him with awe: “the 
starry skies above, and the moral laws within”, implying that moral standards 
create a sense of coherence, as does watching systematic patterns in nature, buy 
also have a transcendent quality that allows us to feel that the majesty of this 
system can be experienced through feelings of purpose in life. Such observations 
suggest that moral standards may create the order and structure necessary to foster 
coherence and the feelings of purpose necessary to create transcendence. 
In the last century, moral psychologists have studied the development of 
moral cognition (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1935; Turiel, 1983), the feelings, and 
cognitions, that result from moral attitudes and beliefs (Haidt, 2001; Mullen & 
Skitka, 2006; Skitka et al., 2005), and the ways that moral standards affect 
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behavior (Bandura, 1991; 1996; 1999; Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Skitka et al, 
2005; Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Psychologists have examined how moral 
standards foster group coherence (Durkheim, 1951; Haidt, Seder, & Kesebir, 
2008; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; 
Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), facilitate the common good and create an environment 
of ideal reciprocity (Piaget, 1935), and steer views of right and wrong (Kohlberg, 
1976; Skitka, et al., 2005). From these functions of morality one can see that 
moral standards are multifaceted and provide predictability and certainty through 
individual and social coordination, affecting feelings of self-worth, and guiding 
the life path in ways that potentially allows one to feel their life matters at a level 
beyond that of the individual.  
Moral standards provide coherence. A wide range of research and 
theory suggests that moral standards are a powerful source of coherence across 
aspects of life that create meaning. Prominent psychologists such as Lawrence 
Kohlberg (1984) have proposed theories of moral development featuring moral 
standards as a source of rules that regulate social norms and behaviors that create 
organizing social principles. For example, adolescents may adhere to their morals 
because they feel that thy represent what is right or wrong, but these adolescents 
also frequently do not have a good reason (Kohlberg, 1984). People often 
experience what I propose are concretely construed moral beliefs with absolute 
certainty (Haidt, 2001). Furthermore, moral standards contribute to the structure 
of society by influencing laws and culture (Durkheim, 1897; Haidt, Seder, & 
Kesibir, 2008), people have a strong need to feel that their behavior is consistent 
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with their beliefs (Hardy & Carlo, 2005), and beliefs imbued with a sense of 
morality (such as some religious beliefs; Hogg et al., 2010) can carry with them 
feelings of literal immortality. Overall, evidence suggests that moral standards are 
a major organizing force across aspects of life that provides coherence.   
Psychological research supports the view that moral standards create 
coherence by providing certainty. People feel a strong impetus to act on behalf of 
their morals (Skitka, 2010), and moral standards give people a framework 
requiring no deliberation regarding how to react to circumstances, as is illustrated 
in cases in which people refuse to endorse eating the family dog, even if it died in 
a car accident (Haidt, 2001). Not only do moral standards guide behavior, people 
see their moral standards as absolutely true and applicable in all circumstances 
(Skitka, 2010). Moral standards are experienced as objective and universal in the 
sense that people experience them as readily apparent and applicable everywhere, 
much as they see the solution to rudimentary arithmetic problems. These 
characteristics of moral standards may contain a built-in sense of coherence by 
providing readily available interpretations of events and behavior as well as 
immediate guidance across situations.  
The characteristics of moral standards may allow them to provide 
coherence by allowing people to unify behind common moral standards. Social 
affiliation is based on consensual beliefs about how we should treat and be treated 
by others (Hogg, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987), and moral standards relate to social referents that give people 
their conceptions of how to treat others (Reed, 2002). Hence, organizing society 
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around moral standards may create coherence by providing powerful and 
immediate intuitive guidance in cooperative settings in which people must 
coordinate action.  
Moral standards may also be an especially powerful organizing force in 
society because they give people clear guidelines about how to behave across 
social contexts. For example, research demonstrates that children will not hit 
other children even if ordered to by an authority figure because they have a gut 
sense that harming another is wrong. However, they will break other rules like 
standing while eating a snack when told by the same authority figure (Nucci & 
Turiel, 1978). Some theorists have even suggested that a sense of unpredictability 
and despair sets in when groups do not have an overarching set of morals to abide 
by and they are forced to abide by their own individual drives and desires 
(Durkheim [1987] 1951, p.208; Haidt, Seder, & Kesebir, 2008). Additional 
research shows that moral standards are not only related to beliefs about how 
people should treat each other, but also to increased intentions to engage in 
collective action, a result that is associated not only with feelings of belonging, 
but with feelings of efficacy and control (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). 
This research suggests that moral standards bind groups together behind a 
common set of goals they feel are ultimately just. De Waal’s (1996) primate 
studies even lead him to conclude that moral standards are actually required to 
live in the complex social systems exhibited by chimps, bonobos, and humans.  
People also create coherence through the idea that they themselves are 
personally consistent and virtuous in their beliefs and attributes. Aristotle, in his 
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Ethics, proposed moral standards as the most important point of reference a 
person can use to evaluate him or herself (McIntyre, 1984; Leach et al., 2007). In 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James (1985) states that moral 
enthusiasm unifies the “discordant self.”  When seeking to create coherent 
representations of the self, people seek to maintain a moral identity, a self-
conception organized around a set of moral traits (Aquino & Reed, 2002). People 
aspire to virtuous behavior and to create a sense of self-worth (Crocker & Wolfe, 
2001; MacDonald, Saltzman, & Leary, 2003; Park, Crocker, & Mikelson, 2004), 
and have a desire to feel morally adequate (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 
1988). People may adhere to moral standards to create the sense of a coherent, 
virtuous self, as an indicator that one is abiding by social rules, fulfilling social 
obligations, and demonstrating competence (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & 
Pastorelli, 1996; Kohlberg, 1984; Leary & Baumeister, 1995). Among children, 
the perception that one has behaved morally is associated with greater self-esteem 
(Reese, Bird, &Tripp, 2007), and moral symbolization (the idea that one’s 
behavior reflects desired moral traits) is related to positive feelings toward the self 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002) a potential source of consistency based on the perception 
that one has lived up to their own standards, and therefore is coherence. Further 
evidence suggests that people seek consistency between moral standards and 
actions because such consistency is important for maintaining relationships that 
aid in survival (Gergen, 1998). 
Moral standards provide transcendence. The sense of objectivity, 
universality, and sacredness provided by moral standards may also contribute to 
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their ability to provide transcendence when moral standards are construed 
abstractly. For example, social identity theorists argue that moral standards are 
capable of providing feelings of transcendence by binding people together into 
tight-knit groups based on a common moral compass (Hogg, 2007; Hogg et al. 
2010; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). People in such groups often feel as if they 
have become “prototypical” group members, and in so doing, lose a sense of 
personal identity, merge with their group identity, and experience a sense of 
belonging to something greater than the individual self (Hogg, et al., 2010). Some 
theorists (Grahm & Haidt, 2010) argue that groups become “moral communities” 
bound together by common beliefs about what is set aside from the rest of human 
behavior as forbidden (i.e. what is absolutely right or wrong, not just right or 
wrong in a specific context; Grahm & Haidt, 2010; Durkheim, 1915/1962, p. 62). 
These same theorists (Grahm & Haidt, 2010) argue along similar lines as social 
identity theorists when they say that moral communities can provide a sense of 
belonging to an entity greater than the sum of its parts. This body of work 
suggests that feelings of affiliation and group synchrony fostered by shared moral 
standards allow people to feel that they have merged with something higher than 
the self (i.e. the group), providing feelings of transcendence. 
Another way people experience a sense of transcendence through moral 
standards is by instilling their own moral standards in their children. This can 
foster symbolic immortality by assuring that a parent’s moral values are carried 
on into the future, even after they have passed on (Lifton & Olson, 1974). 
Instilling moral values in one’s children not only gives children rules to live by, 
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but also allows people to feel as if they are serving a transcendent purpose greater 
than the individual self by solidifying the virtue of future generations.  
Moral vs. Conventional Standards and the Creation of Meaning 
Moral standards may provide coherence more effectively than 
conventional standards. Not only do moral standards create coherence, they may 
do so more effectively than conventional standards. One reason for this is that 
people do not experience conventional standards as objective and universal 
(Skitka, 2010; Skitka et al., 2005). For example, this may be the case if a person 
thinks that people should attend church because it is convention to unite people on 
Sundays, but would be happy with other social engagements that serve the same 
purpose (i.e., they do not experience church attendance as a moral standard). In 
such instances, people will not dislike those who skip church, and may require 
more deliberation about decisions on the extent to which they see skipping church 
as right or wrong. Conversely, a person who holds their beliefs about church 
attendance with moral conviction will always interpret the church attendance of 
others as objectively and universally right or wrong. By viewing the behavior of 
others in society through the lens of moral standards, one can easily come to 
consistent judgments and predictions about others based on their behavior, and 
make clear decisions about how to interact with them. Such quick moral 
judgments may foster a since of coherence.   
If one is attempting to find consistency, for example, by aligning their 
opinion of a person with how that person adheres to conventions, it may be that 
conventional standards create more consistency than moral standards. However, 
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conventions are relative and one may be forced to deliberate to a greater extent 
when deciding how to respond to changes in the environment. Moral standards 
are experienced with immediacy and certainty, and may allow people to quickly 
decide how to align their judgments and behavior with the environment. This 
suggests that the uniformity and immediacy with which moral standards are 
experienced makes them more able to provide coherence than conventional 
standards.  
Although compelling, the evidence suggesting that moral standards may 
be an especially strong contributor to meaning in life is still quite preliminary. No 
research to date has examined whether or not moral standards differ from 
conventional standards in their ability to provide meaning in life, let alone a 
specific dimension of meaning like coherence. For this reason, it is important to 
conduct additional studies that specifically focus on the ability of moral standards 
to provide feelings of meaning in life compared to social convention.  
Moral standards may provide transcendence more effectively than 
conventional standards. As in the case of coherence, preliminary evidence 
suggests that morality may more effectively provide transcendence than social 
convention. For example, a variety of theorists (Durkheim, 1925/1973; Freud 
1923; Kohlberg, 1962; Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Turiel, 1993; Piaget, 1932) argue 
that people experience moral standards as outweighing personal desires and 
trumping the mandates of authority. For example, Durkheim (1925/1973) and 
Freud (1923) suggest that moral standards are sets of norms that have been 
internalized to the point that they are followed even in the absence of authority. 
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Freud suggests that people follow their moral standards even when moral 
behavior conflicts with the desire for ego-driven gain. Kohlberg and Piaget 
suggest that people are willing to ignore the law and social conventions to adhere 
to universal moral laws based on avoiding harming others, These arguments are 
mirrored in studies of moral conviction that demonstrate that people will shirk 
respected authority figures (Skitka & Houston, 2001) and are often willing to 
break the law in the name of what they think is ultimately right (Skitka & Morgan, 
2009). Examples of such moral convictions in real life can be observed in the 
lives of such figures as Muhatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King, who risked 
their safety and eventually their lives fighting in non-violent (and often illegal) 
protest against injustices.  
The fact that people are willing to jeopardize their safety and marginalize 
themselves by breaking laws provides a hint that moral standards may provide 
more meaning in life than conventional standards. If it were the case that 
conventional standards were more capable of creating meaning than moral 
standards, it seems that people would follow the law and live safe lives as 
opposed to violating convention in the name of their moral standards. These 
findings suggest that people feel that their moral standards take precedence over 
their conventional standards, and are experienced with a sense of transcendence 
that goes above and beyond ordinary laws. Broadly, the evidence presented above 
suggests that by focusing on various aspects of life through a moral lens, people 
may be able to experience a sense of both coherence and transcendence. Models 
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of meaning in life (e.g., Heine et al., 2006) all contain descriptions of how 
meaning is not only instilled in people, but also defended when it is under threat.    
Compensation for Threats to Meaning 
In addition to providing a framework for dimensions of meaning, the 
Integrated Model of Meaning makes specific, novel predictions about how people 
fluidly compensate for threats to meaning across dimensions of meaning. Fluid 
compensation is a process in which people shore up meaning when it is threatened, 
either directly, or by looking to an alternative aspect of meaning to compensate 
(Heine et al., 2006). For example, if a person experiences criticism and a 
subsequent reduction in self-esteem, they might try to compensate for this threat 
directly by doing an activity that makes them feel good about themselves (i.e. 
imporoves self-esteem, like volunteering for a charity (a within-components 
compensatory strategy). Alternatively, they might compensate for the same threat 
to meaning by increasing their sense of certainty about a belief (a between-
components compensatory strategy). 
The Integrated Model of Meaning predicts, as do other theories (e.g., 
Stone, Weigand, Cooper, & Aaronson, 1997; Tullett, Teper, & Inzlicht, 2011), 
that people prefer direct compensatory strategies when they are available, but that 
they can also focus on alternative sources of meaning to indirectly compensate for 
meaning threats. The Integrated Model of Meaning also predicts that people are 
able to fluidly compensate within and across dimensions of meaning. For example, 
if a person’s sense of coherence is threatened by unexpected circumstances, they 
may restore meaning by looking to transcendent frameworks of meaning and 
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interpret current unpredictability as parts of a greater plan that ultimately makes 
sense.  
Asymmetrical compensation across dimensions of meaning. In contrast 
to the Meaning Maintenance Model’s predictions that components of meaning can 
compensate interchangeably for damage to any other component, the Integrated 
Model of Meaning predicts that although compensation between components of 
meaning within a dimension may be interchangeable, compensation across 
dimensions is asymmetrical. This asymmetry is the result of the idea that people 
are able to look to either coherent or transcendent meaning to repair coherence 
when a concretely construed component of meaning is threatened, but when the 
entire framework of values and beliefs a person lives by is shattered (the 
transcendent self), it is unlikely to do much good to focus on the predictable 
everyday (i.e., coherent) routines he or she follows in order to restore 
transcendence.  
To illustrate, if a person is exposed to brief, situational incoherence, as is 
the case in studies in which people are shown playing cards of mismatching suit 
and color, they might simply assimilate the inconsistencies into the preexisting 
schematic frameworks to restore coherence (Bruner & Postman, 1949). For 
example, people who receive such an anomalous playing card might simply see a 
heart as a spade to bring the suit of the card into alignment with its color. This 
response would constitute a direct (i.e., a within-dimension) compensation 
strategy. In situations of great unpredictability, such as war or social upheaval 
when no sense of coherence is attainable, however, people might endorse broad 
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(i.e., transcendent) ideologies to restore a sense of consistency (Proulx & Major, 
2013), a key aspect of coherence. The broad construal at which such ideologies 
operate may allow people to find meaning at transcendent levels of abstraction to 
compensate for threats to coherence, and experience situational incoherence as 
but one small part of a larger meaningful whole. In the face of extreme hardship 
in a Nazi concentration camp, for example, Victor Frankl (1963) focused on the 
greater individual purpose of his life and the dissemination of his work and life 
story to maintain feelings of meaning and hope for the future. To the extent that a 
person can turn to meaning operating in abstract construal, they may be able to 
compensate for threats to meaning operating at lower levels of abstraction. In a 
third case, a person might experience a threat to transcendence, possibly if they 
learned the religious beliefs that guide their life’s work were misguided. In such 
circumstances, it seems unlikely that it would to do much good create 
predictability in the immediate physical environment (i.e., coherence), because 
the structures of meaning that have been shattered operate at much higher levels 
of construal and represent the overall purpose of existence. To repair such a threat, 
people most likely have to turn to alternative transcendent frameworks of 
meaning to restore purpose. 
Overall, the theoretical perspective outlined above suggests that people 
can compensate for threats to coherence by shoring up either coherence or 
transcendence, but seeking transcendence can more effectively compensate for 
threats to transcendence than seeking coherence. It is also important to note that 
the asymmetrical nature of compensation proposed above does not suggest that 
	   38	  
there are distinct stages of meaning, as implied by some theorists (e.g., Maslow, 
1943). For example, it is possible for a person with a life characterized by 
incoherence (e.g., poverty and unpredictability) at present to still feel 
transcendence if they thought their circumstances were preparing them for a 
greater overall life purpose, or if they were helping others in a similar plight. This 
means that coherence is not necessary for a person to experience transcendence, 
and one does not need to experience lower levels of meaning to reach more 
abstract levels. It does mean, however, that meaning operating at high levels of 
construal might more universally compensate for threats to meaning, whereas 
meaning operating at low levels of construal may most effectively compensate for 
threats to meaning operating at similar levels of construal. In light of these 
additional arguments, it is important to examine the ways in which moral 
standards may protect meaning construed as both coherence and transcendence 
respectively.  
Moral Standards Protect Meaning 
The predictions made by the Integrated Model of Meaning have 
implications for the manner in which moral standards protect threatened meaning. 
Focusing on moral standards may be more effective at compensating for threats to 
meaning than focusing on other types of standards, like social convention, as 
suggested by research demonstrating that people hold their beliefs about absolute 
right and wrong (i.e., moral beliefs), with a sense of objectivity and universality 
(Skitka et al., 2005), and feelings of sacredness (Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Algoe, 
2004) that may border on the transcendent. If coherence is threatened, for 
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example, a person might first try to compensate for threats to meaning by 
restoring coherence. To the extent that moral standards are a strong source of 
coherence, people may look to moral standards to a greater extent than 
conventional standards to restore such a sense of coherence. However, if 
transcendence is threatened, it may be less effective to look to standards that more 
uniquely relate to coherence, like conventional standards, as a compensatory 
strategy. From these ideas one can ascertain that people will prefer to compensate 
for threats to meaning by endorsing the type of standard most closely tied to the 
dimension of meaning under threat. Based on this idea, I suggest that endorsing 
standards associated with coherence or transcendence (i.e., either conventional or 
moral standards) can remedy threats to coherence (although moral standards may 
be more effective), but transcendence threats may be more effectively remedied 
by shoring up standards strongly tied to transcendence (i.e., moral standards).  
Moral standards may be very effective not only at providing meaning, but 
at compensating for threatened meaning in life. For example, people who 
experience threats to meaning, such as feelings of uncertainty (Van den bos, 
2001) and thoughts of death (Greenberg et al., 1990), become more likely to 
endorse cultural worldviews (which some theorists suggest are connected to 
feelings of symbolic immortality) associated with moral standards (e.g., assigning 
higher bond for crimes; Greenberg et al., 1990). These examples provide vague 
preliminary evidence that people turn to moral standards to restore a sense of 
coherence when frameworks that create certainty are threatened, and to restore 
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transcendence when people are reminded of the ultimate end (and potentially the 
ultimate purposelessness) of life. 
Moral compensation for threats to coherence. Research suggests that 
people compensate for threats to coherence by adhering zealously to threatened 
beliefs by focusing on moral standards. Early research on belief disconfirmation 
describes how threats to the certainty of cult member’s beliefs of the coming of a 
UFO lead them to endorse their beliefs with an even greater strength (Festinger 
1954), which at lest appears similar to the moral zeal often demonstrated by 
people whose certainty is threatened (McGregor, 2006). The cult dealt with 
difficult fact that aliens had not come to retrieve them through the rationalization 
that their proselytizing had saved the earth. Although this work does not explicitly 
draw the conclusion that these rationalizations were based on moral standards, it 
seems likely that at least some of the reason they were effective was because they 
were related to helping, a likely candidate for a moral standard. Recent 
experimental evidence replicates these observations by demonstrating that people 
proselytize on behalf of their beliefs when they are disconfirmed as a way of 
restoring certainty (Gal & Rucker, 2010). Overall, these results suggest that 
people may reaffirm their moral standards when their certainty is violated to 
restore coherence.    
Evidence suggests that people invoke morality to compensate for threats to 
coherence arising from perceptions that they do not behave in ways that are 
consistent with their beliefs. When people complete a pointless and repetitive task 
and view a confederate quit the same task, for example, they are more likely to 
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see their own actions as moral than in a condition in which the faux participant 
perseveres, an effect that disappears when they are able to affirm their self worth 
(Monin & Jordan, 2009). The perception that one has behaved in a way they 
realize is not how they would have wanted seems like a potential threat to 
coherence, and if this is the case, these may effects suggest that people respond to 
threats to coherence with biased interpretations of their adherence to moral 
standards. Similarly, evidence suggests that people who realize that they have 
behaved poorly bias their moral self-evaluations, increasing self-flattering 
information or putting down others (Jordan & Monin, 2008). People behave 
similarly in the presence of people of high ethical stature, a situation that 
decreases positive self-evaluations and may cause feelings of inadequacy 
(Higgins, 1987), by focusing on moral self regard and resenting ethically superior 
others (Monin, 2007). These results suggest focusing on ones own moral 
standards by interpreting events as consistent with expectations may restore 
coherence. 
Moral compensation for threats to transcendence. People are 
sometimes placed in situations, such as warfare, that threaten their sense of 
transcendence and lead them to behave in ways inconsistent with the legacy they 
want to leave behind. For example, American-born Vietnam veterans often 
returned home to the United States feeling they had committed an injustice. 
People placed in such situations may focus on moral frameworks to restore 
transcendence. Soldiers fighting and killing their enemies often do not change 
their conceptions of right and wrong to adapt to the fact they are violating a 
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commonly held moral standard (that one should not kill) but redefine their actions 
so that the act of killing fits into their preexisting moral standards (e.g., protecting 
loved ones, fighting evildoers; Bandura, 1999; Kelman, 1973). The social 
cognitive theory of moral behavior (Bandura, 1999) suggests that people apply 
euphemistic labeling to violent or reprehensible acts, such as calling bombing 
raids “surgical strikes,” civilian deaths “collateral damage,” or the execution of 
criminals “recognition of the sanctity of human life” (Bandura, 1999; Gambino, 
1973). Such moral reasoning may allow people to protect their belief that their 
acts in life will serve the greater good and restore feelings of transcendence. 
Moral standards compensate for threats to meaning more effectively 
than conventional standards. Preliminary evidence suggests that moral 
standards are more effective than conventional standards in compensating for 
threats to meaning. For example, social identity theorists suggest that 
unsuccessful groups might view themselves with a high degree of moral fortitude 
as an alternative to positive evaluation from others (e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, & 
Otten, 1995; Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997). These findings suggest that people 
repair meaning after it is damaged by threats to group affiliation based on not 
upholding social or conventional standards by interpreting affiliation through a 
moral lens. This moral lens may protect coherence by allowing people to interpret 
events to suggest that that they are especially representative of their group, and 
interpreting group characteristics to suggest that their group adheres to moral 
standards. The observation that these groups do not attempt to shore up positive 
evaluations instead of moral evaluations suggests that morality is a more desired 
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and potentially more effective compensatory strategy than looking to alternative 
angles of group perceptions.  
There is very little evidence to my knowledge that suggests that moral 
standards compensate for threats to transcendence to a greater extent than 
conventional standards. It seems intuitive that this would be the case, however, 
because people experience their moral standards as objective and sacred. 
Conventional standards can be changed more easily than moral standards (if 
moral standards can be changed at all) and do not invoke feelings of objective 
truth. Hence, conventional standards may be less effective than moral standards at 
restoring an overall sense of purpose under threat. To the extent that one has to 
consider whether or not an action is appropriate (as is the case with convention) 
conventions may be less effective at repairing transcendence than morals, which 
give immediate guidance as to whether or not something is right or wrong. It may 
be the case that conventional standards not only do not compensate for threats to 
transcendence as effectively as moral standards, but that conventional standards 
do not contribute to transcendence to a large extent in general.     
Rationale and Hypotheses 
 Psychological research has examined meaning in terms of consistency and 
predictability that aids in survival, as well as in terms of feelings of greater 
purpose in life. Research on meaning has not only examined people’s feelings of 
consistency and purpose, but also how people defend these feelings of meaning 
once they are established. Additional research suggests that moral standards are 
related to constructs that have been theoretically related to meaning in life. 
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However, no research has specifically examined factors that allow people to 
effectively create and defend meaning at both concrete and abstract levels of 
construal. Finally, no research has examined whether or not people compensate 
for threats to meaning most effectively by focusing on components of meaning at 
an equal or greater level of construal than the meaning under threat. 
Goals of the Current Investigation 
 The purpose of the present investigation was to expand upon the previous 
meaning literature in four ways.  
 
1. The current investigation expanded on previous investigations of 
meaning by examining whether moral standards are more effective at 
providing meaning than conventional standards.  
 
2. This work assessed whether endorsing moral standards are more 
effective than conventional standards at providing meaning within and 
across the dimensions of coherence and transcendence, proposed by 
Wetherell (unpublished manuscript).   
 
3. The current investigation examined whether or not endorsing moral 
standards is especially effective at compensating for threats to meaning 
compared to endorsing conventional standards.  
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4. The current investigation examined whether the overall advantage 
moral standards have in providing both coherence and transcendence 
compared to convention is especially large for transcendence. 
 
The rationale described above can be organized into two overarching sets 
of predictions. The first set of predictions examined whether endorsing moral 
standards in terms of both coherence and transcendence provides meaning to a 
greater extent than endorsing conventional standards  
 
Hypothesis I The Moral Primacy Hypothesis predicts a main effect of 
type of standards, such that participants will endorse moral standards as 
providing more meaning than conventional standards 
 
 Moral standards may be more effective at providing coherence and 
transcendence than conventional standards, but moral standards are most likely 
also experienced in terms of abstract construal (i.e., transcendence) to a greater 
extent than conventional standards. Hence, moral standards may be even more 
effective in providing transcendence than coherence compared to conventional 
standards. 
 
Hypothesis II: The Fit Hypothesis predicts a Type of Standard × 
Construal Level interaction, such that domain endorsement will depend on how 
well it fits the situational construal. Specifically, participants will more strongly 
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endorse moral standards as providing meaning in high-level (abstract) than low-
level (concrete) framing conditions; conversely, participants will more strongly 
endorse conventional standards as providing meaning in low-level (concrete) than 
high-level (abstract) framing conditions. (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Predicted results from Study 1 
 
 
 
 
 
A further derivation of this first set of predictions is that activating states 
of concrete vs. abstract construal will affect the extent to which endorsing moral 
and conventional standards will differentially provide coherence and 
transcendence. That is, endorsing moral standards should be more effective in 
creating coherence and transcendence than conventional standards overall, 
however this difference should be greater for transcendence, but these patterns 
will be qualified by the construal level in which a person is operating (abstract vs. 
concrete). 
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Hypothesis III: Integrating the foregoing with the assumption that moral 
standards are more likely than conventional standards to be perceived as 
applicable across a wide variety of contexts yields the Asymmetry 
Hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts a Type of Standard × Construal 
Level × Dimension of Meaning interaction. such that the morality 
advantage predicted by the Moral Primacy Hypothesis should be more 
pronounced in high-level (abstract) than low-level (concrete) framing 
condition. This hypothesis predicts that in states of concrete construal 
moral standards will provide more coherence and transcendence than 
convention, but this will be especially the case for coherence. In states of 
abstract construal morality will create more coherence and transcendence 
than convention, but this will be especially the case for transcendence (see 
Figure 2). 
 
To address the second set of predictions, the current proposal will test how 
people respond to threats to meaning. Specifically, I will test whether or not 
people endorse moral  
standards to a greater extent than conventional standards both generally and after
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Figure 2: Predicted results from Study 2  
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threats to coherence and transcendence. To the extent that endorsing moral 
standards provides powerful structure and predictability as well as broad and 
transcendent meaning, people may endorse moral standards to restore threatened 
meaning, particularly transcendent meaning. 
 
Hypothesis IV: People will endorse both conventional and moral 
standards to a greater extent after an induction of threats to meaning 
compared to a neutral condition.  
 
Furthermore, because moral standards are proposed to be more effective in 
compensating for both threats to coherence and transcendence because of their 
objective, universal, and sacred nature, people may be more likely to endorse 
moral compared to conventional standards after threats in general. 
 
Hypothesis V: To the extent that moral standards are more generally able 
to allay threats to meaning than conventional standards, the main effect of 
threat in Hypothesis IV will be qualified by type of standard; People will 
endorse moral standards to a much greater extent than conventional 
standards after induction of threats to meaning in general, compared to a 
neutral condition, in which people will endorse moral standards more than 
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conventional standards, but to a lesser extent. This pattern is depicted in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Predicted Results From Study 3. 
 
 
  
Finally, the current investigation tested whether or not moral standards are not  
only endorsed more frequently than conventional standards after threats, but if 
moral standards are especially able to compensate for threats to transcendence. 
Coherence operates at low levels of construal and people may endorse moral 
standards compared to conventional standards to shore up coherence or 
transcendence. This may be an effective strategy because people may be able to 
compensate for threats to meaning in general by looking to more abstract meaning. 
In addition, moral standards are likely to operate at a higher level of abstraction 
than conventional standards. Hence, following transcendence threats, people may 
especially endorse moral compared to conventional standards to restore 
transcendence. 
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Hypothesis VI: When coherence is threatened, participants will endorse 
moral standards to a greater extent than conventional standards, but no 
differences in endorsement will occur in a neutral condition. However, 
when transcendence is threatened, participants will endorse moral 
standards to a much greater extent than conventional standards, but no 
difference will emerge in a neutral condition (see Figure 3).  
 
Study 1 Overview 
 
The purpose of Study 1 was to test the prediction that people endorse 
moral standards more than conventional standards to create coherence and 
transcendence. Study 1 also tested the idea that moral standards create much more 
coherence than transcendence compared to conventional standards. In order to test 
these hypotheses, participants responded to items assessing the extent to which 
they endorse moral and conventional standards as providing both coherence and 
transcendence. In both the conventional and moral standard scales, there are items 
to measure the extent to which conventional and moral standards provide 
coherence and transcendence; and are geared towards assessing the extent to 
which each type of standard provides feelings of predictability and certainty in the 
environment. Items measuring the extent to which conventional and moral 
standards provide transcendence are geared towards assessing the extent to which 
each type of standard provides feelings that life has an overall purpose.  
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To test the validity of these newly created items I also included measures 
to examine convergent and discriminant validity. These scales included the 
Behavior Identification Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), and a short, Need for 
Closure Scale (Roets & Van Heil, 2011).  
As a measure of criterion validity, I included a measure of meaning in life 
(the presence of meaning subscale from The Meaning in Life Questionnaire 
[MLQ], Steger, Frasier, Oishi & Kaler, 2006), and the Sense of Coherence Scale 
(SOC; Antonovski, 1993). The SOC includes three items geared towards 
measuring meaning in life that correspond to transcendence (marked with an 
asterisk in Appendix G; e.g., Until now, your life has had… no clear goals or 
purpose at all/very clear goals and purpose”).  
Study 1 Hypotheses 
Study 1 is based on two primary sets of tests. The first set examines the 
moral primacy and asymmetry hypotheses. The expected patterns reflected by 
these hypotheses (relevant only to Hypotheses I and II) are depicted in Figure 1. 
The second set of tests, which are exploratory, provides a brief examination of the 
properties of the coherence and transcendence scales including five steps to 
explore the factor structure of these scales. The second set of tests also examines 
the convergent, discriminant, and criterion validity of the coherence and 
transcendence measures.  
 
Primary Hypotheses: Tests of the Moral Primacy and Asymmetry 
Hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis I. There will be a main effect of type of standard. When 
endorsing the extent to which moral and conventional standards provide 
coherence and transcendence, participants will endorse moral standards as 
providing both coherence and transcendence to a greater extent than 
conventional standards.  
 
Hypothesis II. The main effect of type of standard will be qualified by 
dimension of meaning (coherence vs. transcendence), such that 
participants will endorse moral standards as providing much more 
transcendence than convention, and as providing slightly more coherence 
than convention (see Figure 1).  
 
Exploratory Analyses: Predictions for Scale Exploration. 
 
Part I. The items measuring the extent to which moral standards provide 
coherence and transcendence, and the items measuring the extent to which 
conventional standards provide coherence and transcendence, will load 
onto separate factors. This will result in factors representing the extent to 
which endorsing conventional standards provides coherence and 
transcendence, and the extent to which endorsing moral standards provides 
coherence and transcendence. 
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Part II. Based on the theoretical perspective that coherence operates at a 
lower level of construal than transcendence, the Behavior Identification 
Form will negatively relate to endorsement of moral and conventional 
standards as providing coherence, and positively relate to endorsement of 
moral and conventional standards as providing transcendence. 
 
Part III. The measures of endorsement of moral and conventional 
standards as providing coherence should positively relate to the preference 
for order, preference for predictability, and discomfort with ambiguity 
(subscales of the Need for Closure Scale). The measures of endorsement 
of moral and conventional standards as providing transcendence should 
positively relate to open-mindedness (a subscale of the Need for Closure 
Scale).  
 
Part IV. The Sense of Coherence (SOC) scale items measuring coherence 
should positively relate to endorsement of moral and conventional 
standards as providing coherence, and the SOC items measuring 
transcendence will positively relate to endorsement of moral and 
conventional standards as providing transcendence. 
 
Part V. The presence of meaning subscale of the MLQ should relate 
positively to endorsement of moral and conventional standards as 
providing transcendence. 
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Study 1 Method 
Participants  
 There were 590 participants in Study 1 (NMen = 231; NWomen = 357; 2 
failed to report) who completed an online survey through Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk is an online service through which people can 
pay workers small sums of money to complete simple tasks, such as online studies. 
Participants were paid 50 cents. 
 Procedure and Measures 
In Study 1, participants signed up for the study on Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk online interface and received a link to the survey materials. First, 
participants completed either a measure of endorsement of conventional or moral 
standards as providers of meaning. The remainder of the survey materials was 
fully randomized, such that each separate, complete measure was assigned in a 
random order to all participants.  
To create a survey layout allowing me to assess the extent to which 
morality and convention create coherence and transcendence, I first had 
participants read prompts asking them to write briefly about some of the moral or 
conventional standards they follow in their lives. They then rated their agreement 
with statements assessing the extent to which they endorse moral or conventional 
standards. Participants always responded to questions about conventional 
standards after writing about their conventional standards and always responded 
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to questions about moral standards after writing about their moral standards. The 
demographics always came last. 
 Prompts for morality and convention measures. To measure the extent 
that endorsing moral and conventional standards provides a sense of both 
coherence and transcendence, participants completed a series of scales assessing 
the extent to which they endorse conventional and moral standards they 
commonly adhere to as providing both coherence and transcendence. Before 
completing these scales, participants read a prompt orienting them to either 
respond to their feelings about conventional or moral standards (see Appendices 
A and B for example responses from participants): 
 
Conventional Standards Prompt 
All people follow conventions in one form or another. Conventions are standard 
practices that are commonly followed in a particular society. Conventions can 
vary from place to place, and when a person experiences a standard as 
conventional, they see it as applying differently from one society to another based 
on the customs of the society in question and the social situation at hand.  
 
For example, in some countries, people drive on the right side of the road, but in 
others, they drive on the left side of the road. Some cultures eat with chopsticks 
and others eat with forks and spoons, and in some countries it is customary to 
consult family members when selecting a marriage partner, but in other countries 
it is not. The people that engage in these acts often see them as conventional, 
	   57	  
meaning that they follow them only because it is the norm to do so. As a result, 
people do not see the standards of behavior described by their conventions as 
absolutely right or wrong, and will often adjust their conventions when in 
different situations. Despite this, people can get annoyed or offended when others 
violate their conventional norms.  
 
We would like you to please spend a few minutes to write a paragraph about some 
of the conventions you frequently follow that fit the description of conventions 
given in the first paragraph above. Please try to think of the conventions you 
abide by on a daily basis and give an example of how they affect your behavior on 
a day-to-day basis. 
 
Moral Standards Prompt 
All people follow morals in one form or another. Morals are beliefs and standards 
that a person sees as representing what is absolutely right or wrong. This means 
that morals are experienced as representing what is absolutely right or wrong in 
all societies and situations regardless of the laws or customs of a given place.  
 
For example, some people feel that everyone has the right to move from one 
economic class to another through hard work, and would think it unjust to deny 
opportunities for success based on arbitrary things like gender or skin color. 
Some people adhere to specific diets because they think eating certain foods (e.g., 
pork) is immoral, and others feel morally invested in political issues like gun 
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control or same-sex marriage. Because morals are seen as absolutely right or 
wrong regardless of the context, people are deeply invested in their morals, and 
feel angry at, and disgusted by, people who violate their morals. 
 
We would like you to please spend a few minutes to write a paragraph about some 
of your own morals that fit the description of morals given in the first paragraph 
above. Please try to think of the morals you abide by on a daily basis and give an 
example of how they affect your behavior on a day-to-day basis. 
 
 In these prompts, participants were given a definition of either moral or 
conventional standards. They were then asked to write a paragraph describing 
some of the conventions they abide by in everyday life, or some of the moral 
standards they abide by in everyday life. Then, following the prompt, participants 
responded to questions about the extent to which the conventional or moral 
standards they follow provide both coherence and transcendence.  
Responses to the conventional and moral standard scales. After 
reading the conventional and moral standards prompts and completing the writing 
activity, participants completed a series of scales assessing the extent to which 
conventional or moral standards provide coherence and transcendence (see 
Appendix C). These scales were created to tap into the construct of coherence by 
assessing the extent to which conventional and moral standards create certainty, 
predictability, and safety, which are all aspects of coherence proposed by previous 
theorists (Wetherell, unpublished manuscript). These items also tap into the extent 
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to which convention creates a sense of coherence in participants across areas of 
life that provide meaning proposed by previous theorists (Heine et al, 2006). All 
items were rated on a 1 = not at all to 7 = very much scale in which participants 
rated the extent to which having conventional and moral standards to abide by 
provides coherence and transcendence. The measure included items designed to 
tap into each dimension of meaning (e.g. coherence” “The conventions I follow in 
my daily life… Enable me to create a structured mode of life”; e.g. transcendence 
“Make me feel that my day to day routine contributes to something greater than 
myself). As noted at the bottom of Appendix C, the concrete and abstract 
measures of coherence and transcendence include items to assess components of 
meaning proposed by previous theorists (Heine et al., 2006; i.e. certainty, 
belonging, self-esteem, and symbolic immortality). The items measuring both 
coherence (α = .90) and transcendence (α = .96) showed good internal reliability. 
Behavior Identification Form. To assess the extent to which participants 
have a general tendency to operate in a state of concrete compared to abstract 
construal, they responded to the Behavior Identification Form (Appendix E; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989; α = .86) which assesses the extent to which people 
chronically focus on low (performing simple actions to complete a task) or high-
level, abstract goals (the overall reason for completing a task), with higher values 
on this scale representing higher level goals. In the BIF, participants chose one of 
two options that best represents their views of a variety of actions. For example, if 
a participant classified “making a list” as “getting organized” as opposed to 
“writing things down” the response would be considered indicative of abstract 
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construal. Conversely, if the participant chose “writing things down” as opposed 
to “getting organized” the action would be classified as concrete construal. To the 
extent that moral and conventional coherence and transcendence operate at lower 
and higher levels of construal, they should negatively and positively correlate 
with the BIF respectively. This would provide convergent evidence suggesting 
that the newly created scales measuring meaning from morality and convention at 
high and low levels of construal do in fact capture meaning at these respective 
levels of construal. 
 Short Need for Closure Scale. Participants completed a shortened Need 
for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Heil, 2011; see Appendix F; α = .78), with items 
measuring the extent to which participants are open-minded, prefer order, 
predictability, and dislike ambiguity. The items were rated on a 1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree scale. Example items include “I find that a well 
ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament” and “I do not usually 
consult many different opinions before forming my own view.” The Need for 
Closure Scale allowed me to assess whether or not the coherence and 
transcendence items correlated in an expected fashion with items tapping into a 
desire to make quick and coherent decisions, providing convergent validity. 
 Sense of Coherence Scale (SOC). Participants completed a short version 
of Antonovski’s (1993; α = .86) Sense of Coherence Scale (see Appendix G). 
This scale measures a global orientation capturing feelings of confidence that 
events make sense and that one has the resources to cope with them. The measure 
was completed on 1 to 7 scales with the response anchors varying based on the 
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question. Example items include “Do you have the feeling that you are in an 
unfamiliar situation and don’t know what to do?” (1 = very often, 7 = very seldom 
or never). To the extent that the moral and conventional coherence scales are valid 
measures of the extent to which morality and convention create coherence, they 
should positively correlate with the SOC scale.    
Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ). Participants completed the 
Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Steger et al., 2006; α = .92) to measure the extent 
to which they feel purpose in their lives (see Appendix H). This scale consists of 
five items on a 1 = absolutely untrue to 7 = absolutely true scale assessing the 
extent to which people feel a broad sense of meaning in life (e.g. “I have 
discovered a satisfying life purpose”). To the extent that the measures of moral 
and conventional coherence and transcendence capture the extent to which people 
feel coherence and transcendence in these domains respectively, they should 
positively relate to feelings of meaning in life. To the extent that the morality and 
convention create feelings of transcendence, the moral and conventional 
transcendence scales should be especially predictive of the MLQ scale.    
Demographics. Finally, participants responded to a series of demographic 
measures, such as age, sex, political orientation, income, and religious orientation 
and religious strength (see Appendix I) 
 
 
 
Study 1 Results  
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There were two overarching goals of the first study. The first goal, 
corresponding to the primary hypotheses, was to test whether there is a main 
effect of type of standard, such that moral standards create more coherence and 
transcendence than conventional standards, and an interaction between type of 
standard and dimension of meaning, such that morality creates more coherence 
than convention, and much more transcendence than convention. The secondary 
goal, (which corresponds to the scale exploration) was to explore the factor 
structure, convergent, discriminant, and criterion validity of the coherence and 
transcendence scales for morality and convention. To accomplish these goals, I 
first used the original, a-priori scales to test the interaction between dimension of 
meaning and type of standard, corresponding to the primary study hypotheses. I 
then conducted the scale analyses to examine the behavior of the coherent and 
transcendent standards scales. 
Tests of the Primary Hypotheses 
Pilot test. Before collecting the full sample from Mturk, I conducted a 
short pilot test (N = 48, on Mturk) to make sure that participants responded to the 
prompts for conventional and moral standards in the expected fashion. I examined 
the written responses to the prompts to assess whether or not people described 
moral and conventional standards distinctly.  Participants also responded to 
questions (see Appendix D) to assess whether or not the conventions or morals 
they wrote about have the characteristics of conventional or moral standards. 
These questions tapped into the authority independence, sense of objectivity and 
universality, and strong emotions that characterize how people experience their 
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moral standards, and were coded so that higher numbers represent moral 
standards (i.e. objective, universal, sacred, and emotionally laden standards). The 
results presented in Table 1 show that participants consistently rated their morals 
as more objective, universal, and emotionally charged than their conventions. 
These results demonstrate that the writing prompt was successful in 
differentiating between morals and conventions. 
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Table 1: Results From Study 1 Pilot Test 
 t Mmoral SD Mconvention SD 
I think that other people should follow the 
[conventions/morals] I just wrote about in all situations. 
2.72** 5.31 1.74 3.82 2.06 
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are no more 
important than any of my other beliefs. 
3.12** 2.77 1.70 4.41 1.95 
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are sacred to 
me. 
2.71** 4.96 1.95 3.41 2.02 
Even if it were against the law, I would follow the 
conventions I just wrote about. 
2.83** 4.92 2.12 3.27 1.88 
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about represent what 
I think is absolutely right or wrong. 
3.30** 5.04 1.93 3.27 1.75 
There is nothing special about the [conventions/morals] I 
just wrote about. 
4.03*** 2.54 1.36 4.55 2.06 
I would be willing to change the [conventions/morals] that 
I just wrote about if I was in a situation in which other 
people wanted me to. 
3.30** 2.08 1.29 3.64 1.97 
When people violate the [conventions/morals] I just wrote 
about I do not usually get angry with them. 
4.16*** 3.12 1.64 5.27 1.91 
When people violate the [conventions/morals] I just wrote 
about I am disgusted with them. 
3.67*** 5.12 1.70 3.18 1.94 
I feel that the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are 
sacred. 
2.88** 4.96 1.87 3.38 1.88 
I would change the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about 
if I were in another country where people have different 
beliefs. 
2.76** 2.42 1.70 3.86 1.91 
Note: Participants in Study 1 wrote about either their conventional or moral standards. The wording of each item 
either asked about conventional or moral standards. +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Hypotheses I and II. To test hypotheses I and II, I ran a 2 between (Type of 
Standard; moral vs. conventional) by 2 within (Dimension of Meaning: coherence 
vs. transcendence) mixed ANOVA. I used the original scales designed to measure 
coherent and transcendent conventional and moral standards. Consistent with 
hypotheses, there was a main effect of type of standard F (1, 531) = 55.29, p 
<.001, ηp2 = .002, such that moral standards were a greater source of coherence 
and transcendence than conventional standards. Consistent with predictions, there 
was a significant interaction between type of standard and dimension of meaning 
F (1,531) = 62.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. This interaction is depicted in Figure 4. 
Simple effects tests demonstrated that participants rated moral standards as a 
greater source of coherence than conventional standards F (1, 531) = 25.54, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .05. Consistent with hypotheses, this pattern was even greater for 
transcendence, F (1, 531) = 73.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. Also consistent with 
hypotheses, moral standards were a greater source of transcendence than 
coherence F (1, 531) =  26.12, p < .01, ηp2 = .05. In addition, conventional 
standards were rated as providing more coherence than transcendence F (1, 531) 
= 36.18 p < .001, ηp2 = .06.   
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Figure 4: Results from Study 1. 
  
 
Scale Exploration 
 After conducting the primary analyses, I next conducted scale exploration. 
The primary hypotheses were confirmed with the a-priori scales based in my 
theoretical perspective. Hence the goal of this exploration is to provide an initial 
test of the factor structure of these scale, and potential evidence for convergent 
and divergent validity, and not to assess whether or not the patterns from the 
primary hypotheses differences in coherence and transcendence. 
Part I. To test Part I of the scale exploration 1, I ran two separate 
exploratory factor analyses using principle axis factoring and direct-oblimin 
rotation. I expected a two-factor solution within the moral and conventional 
standard writing conditions differentiating between the items capturing 
conventional standards and the items capturing moral standards. This analysis 
failed to converge across several attempts because of serious issues of 
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multicollinearity. For this reason it was not possible to examine Part 1 of the scale 
analyses   
Part II. To examine Part II of the exploratory scale analyses, I examined 
correlations between the BIF and the full measures of coherence and 
transcendence across the morality and convention conditions (see Table 2 for the 
correlations from Hypotheses II to VI). In all further analyses, I examined 
coherence and transcendence by averaging all the a-priori coherence and 
transcendence items into separate scales. The BIF, with higher numbers 
representing broader construal, was positively correlated with coherence, and 
positively correlated to a slightly larger extent with transcendence. 
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Table 2: Correlations from Study 1 Scale Analyses Parts II Though V. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Coherence --          
Transcendence .81*** --         
BIF .13** .20*** --        
Open-
mindedness 
-.16*** -.17*** -.21*** --       
Need for order 
and structure 
.36*** .33*** .14*** -.06 --      
Discomfort with 
ambiguity 
.16*** .11*** .04 -.03 .36*** --     
Preference for 
predictability 
.34*** .27*** .09* .10* .50*** .56*** --    
SOC coherence  .14*** .18*** .14*** -.12** .12** -.20*** -.07 --   
SOC 
transcendence 
.26*** .36*** .23*** -.16*** .21*** -.06 .02 .64*** --  
MLQ .32*** .39*** .16*** -.10* .18*** -.04 -.01 .48*** .68*** -- 
Note: +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Part III. To test convergent and discriminant validity, I examined the 
correlations between coherence and transcendence, and each subscale of the need 
for closure measure. Both coherence and transcendence were positively related to 
need for structure, discomfort with ambiguity, and preference for predictability. 
Coherence exhibited larger correlations with these measures, but to a very small 
extent. Oddly, coherence and transcendence were equally negatively correlated 
with open-mindedness.    
 Part IV. To test the criterion validity of the coherence items, as well as 
provide an additional test of convergent and discriminant validity, I examined the 
correlations between coherence and transcendence, and the items in the SOC 
measuring coherence and transcendence. All correlations were positive. Counter 
to expectations, the correlations between the full coherence and transcendence 
scales and the SOC coherence items appeared weaker than the correlations 
between the SOC transcendence items and coherence and transcendence. There 
appeared to be a larger correlation between the SOC transcendence items and 
transcendence than the SOC transcendence items and coherence.  
 Part V. To examine Part V and examine the criterion validity of the 
transcendence items, as well as provided additional tests of convergent and 
discriminant validity, I examined the correlations between coherence and 
transcendence and the MLQ. The MLQ was positively related to both coherence 
and transcendence, with a slightly higher correlation with transcendence as 
expected. 
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Study 1 Discussion 
Test of the Primary Hypotheses 
The results of Study 1 showed strong results for the primary hypotheses. 
Moral standards provided more coherence and transcendence than conventional 
standards, and the difference between transcendence and coherence was 
especially large for moral standards. These results suggest that moral standards 
are a powerful source of meaning in life. In addition, these results suggest that 
moral standards are an especially powerful source of transcendent meaning, and 
that they allow people to feel that their lives have a greater purpose than meets the 
eye. The results of Study 1 thus lend credence to both the moral primacy and 
asymmetry hypotheses.   
 The results for Study 1 also map onto the theoretical perspective presented 
in this paper suggesting that the objective and universal characteristics of moral 
standards provide meaning, especially transcendence. Although I did not 
explicitly include items examining the objective and universal experience of 
moral standards alongside the coherence and transcendence scales in Study 1, the 
results of the pilot test suggest that participants experienced their moral standards 
as objective and universal. In combination, the pilot test and primary analyses 
map onto the theoretical perspective that the objective and universal 
characteristics of moral standards provide more meaning overall, and especially 
transcendence, than conventional standards. Further research could provide more 
explicit tests of this idea by including measures of objectivity and universality, 
and testing whether or not they mediate the relationship between type of standard, 
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coherence and transcendence. In addition, the idea that the objective and universal 
characteristics of moral standards provide may have interesting implications for 
existing research. It may be the case that the (sometimes) extreme behaviors 
people endorse on behalf of their moral beliefs in the extant literature (e.g.,Skitka 
& Houston, 2001) are motivated by a sense of objective meaning provided by 
morals. 
I found partial support for Part II through V of the scale analyses 
examining the convergent and discriminant validity of the coherence and 
transcendence measures. The scales expected to correlate positively with 
coherence did positively correlate with coherence, and the items expected to 
positively correlate with transcendence correlated positively with transcendence. 
However, there were positive correlations between all measures, which was not 
expected, and in most cases these correlations were not much different from one 
another in magnitude, limiting the discriminant validity of the coherence and 
transcendence scales.  
 The mixed support for Part II through VI of the scale analyses may also 
have one or more explanations. Overall, there were positive correlations between 
both the coherence and transcendence scales. It is possible that participants 
viewed the items assessing coherence and transcendence as a single unit. That is, 
participants may have felt all the coherence and transcendence items were in fact 
measuring a one-dimensional construct of meaning. At second glance, this high 
correlation between coherence and transcendence was not surprising, as one 
would expect that strongly held standards provide a strong sense of 
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meaningfulness in multiple ways, and should thus be correlated highly. This also 
provides some support for the assertion of the integrated model of meaning that 
people may use one dimension of meaning (e.g., coherence) as a springboard to 
create the other (e.g., transcendence). 
From this perspective, it is also not surprising that the items designed to 
measure both coherence and transcendence correlated reliably and positively with 
the scales included to assess convergent, discriminant, and criterion validity. To 
the extent that the measures of coherent and transcendent moral standards capture 
a sense of meaningfulness, they should both relate to measures capturing 
consistency and predictability (e.g. the SOC) and scales assessing a broader sense 
of meaningfulness (e.g. The MLQ). In addition, there should be some overlap 
between coherence and transcendence; especially if it is the case that 
transcendence provides a degree of coherence. For this reason, it is not surprising 
that both coherence and transcendence measures both positively predicted the BIF.  
The pattern of correlations for Part II through V of the scale analyses may 
not be surprising for another reason as well. The validation scales designed to 
capture transcendence (i.e. the MLQ and the SOC transcendence items) seemed to 
correlate a bit more strongly with the scale assessing the dimension of 
transcendence than the items measuring the dimension of coherence. The scale 
designed to measure the dimension of coherence and the dimension of 
transcendence seemed to correlate more or less equally with the Need for Closure 
Scale dimensions and the SOC coherence items. This may be in line with the 
asymmetry hypothesis that transcendence serves to provide coherence. To the 
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extent that people have standards that provide them with a sense of transcendence, 
these standards should provide high levels of coherence, which may explain the 
equal correlations of the coherence and transcendence dimensions with the facets 
of need for closure and the soc coherence items. However having standards that 
provide coherence should not lead people to experience the broader sense of 
meaning measured in the MLQ and SOC transcendence items.  
In order to provide additional clarity to these results, there are additional 
analytic strategies and methodological changes that may be incorporated into 
future research. First, because of the high correlation between the coherent and 
transcendent dimension scales, it may be wise to present them to participants 
separately, as opposed to as a unit. If participants respond to the items assessing 
each dimension of meaning as separate units, they may respond to the coherent 
and transcendent dimensions in a way that taps into each respective dimension 
more reliably. It may also be worth counterbalancing the scales to assess whether 
the presentation of one dimension first leads to a higher correlation between the 
measures. To the extent that the asymmetry hypothesis is correct, it may be the 
case that allowing participants to complete the transcendence measure first (and 
potentially affirm feelings of transcendence) will lead to a stronger correlation 
with coherence.   
 It may also be wise to consider additional analytic strategies in which the 
coherent and transcendent dimension scales are included in models 
simultaneously to account for their shared variance, leaving only the unique 
variability associated with each dimension of meaning. If one were to predict each 
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dimension of meaning with each additional validation scale (e.g. NFC, the MLQ 
and SOC), clearer patterns may emerge.     
Overall, the results of Study 1 suggest that people derive a strong sense of 
meaning from their moral standards, and that moral standards are an especially 
strong provider of transcendence. To provide more solid evidence that moral 
standards are a stronger source of coherence and transcendence than conventional 
standards, especially in the domain of transcendence, Study 2 aims to 
experimentally manipulate construal level. If inducing concrete and abstract 
construal activates a tendency to focus on coherence or transcendence 
respectively, it should lead people to endorse conventional and moral standards as 
providing more or less coherence or transcendence, depending on the level of 
construal in which a person is operating. 
Study 2 Overview 
The Study 1 design allowed me to examine whether morality provides 
more meaning across dimensions than convention, and whether this difference is 
greater for transcendence than coherence. The goal of Study 2 was to expand on 
the results of Study 1 and provide additional evidence that morality is indeed 
more effective at providing coherence and transcendence than convention. 
Furthermore, Study 2 tested the idea that states of concrete (compared to abstract) 
construal increase the extent to which people feel a sense of coherence (but not 
transcendence to the same degree), through morality compared to convention, and 
that states of abstract (compared to concrete) construal lead people to experience 
more transcendence (but not coherence to the same degree) through morality 
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compared to convention. According to construal level theory, people in states of 
concrete construal focus on the specifics of a situation whereas people in abstract 
construal focus on the larger picture (Trope & Liberman, 2010). In other words, 
one might think of concrete construal as looking at the trees and abstract construal 
as looking at the forest (Fujita, 2008). To induce either concrete or abstract 
construal the NAVON task requires participants to quickly examine a compound 
letter made of smaller letters. For example, a participant might be presented with 
a compound A that is formed with a large amount of small Bs. To induce concrete 
construal, participants would be asked to identify whether or not a series of 
compound letters were formed with a specific small letter (e.g., a B). To induce 
abstract construal, participants would be asked to identity whether the compound 
letter is a specific letter (e.g., an A).  
By inducing states of concrete and abstract construal and observing the 
extent to which people endorse moral over conventional standards differentially 
across levels of construal, Study 2 provided a more thorough test of the idea that 
coherence operates in states of concrete construal and transcendence operates in 
states of abstract construal. Study 2 also provides a more thorough test of the idea 
that people endorse moral standards as providing the dimension of meaning that is 
most accessible to participants. This provides an experimental test that coherence 
and transcendence are indeed experienced, at and are most clearly associated with, 
concrete and abstract construal, respectively. It also provides a test of the idea that 
that moral standards are especially effective at creating each dimension of 
meaning in its associated state of construal compared to conventional standards.   
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Study 2 Hypotheses                  
Study 2 was based on three primary hypotheses, the expected patterns 
reflected by these hypotheses are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Hypothesis I. There should be a main effect of type of standard such that 
participants will endorse moral standards as providing more coherence and 
transcendence than conventional standards overall. 
 
Hypothesis II. There should be a two-way interaction between dimension 
of meaning and construal level, such that inducing states of concrete 
construal will lead participants to endorse standards as providing more 
coherence, and inducing abstract construal will lead participants to 
endorse standards as creating more transcendence. 
 
Hypothesis III. To the extent that morality is more effective than 
convention at providing meaning, the two way-interaction described above 
should be stronger when participants endorse the meaning provided by 
moral standards than by endorsing the meaning provided by convention. 
That is, type of standard will qualify the above-mentioned two-way 
interaction. In states of concrete construal, people will endorse moral 
standards as creating slightly more transcendence than conventional 
standards, but will endorse moral standards as providing much more 
coherence than is created by conventional standards (see left side of 
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Figure 2). However, in states of abstract construal, morality will be 
endorsed as creating slightly more coherence than is created by convention, 
but abstract construal will lead people to endorse morality as creating 
much more transcendence than is created by convention (see right side of 
Figure 2). 
Study 2 Method 
Participants  
 Participants were 113 people (Nmen = 38) and (Nwomen = 75) enrolled in 
undergraduate level introductory psychology courses at DePaul University. The 
study used a 2 (Construal Level: Concrete vs. Abstract) X 2 (Type of Standard: 
Conventional vs. Moral) X 2(Dimension of Meaning: Coherence vs. 
Transcendence) mixed design, with Dimension of Meaning as a within subjects 
factor. To determine the number of subjects to be used in the experiment, I used 
G*Power version 3.1 specifying an F test for a mixed-ANOVA with one 2-level, 
within-subjects factor, and four between subject measurement groups. I specified 
a small effect size when computing the power analysis (ηp2 = .04; Cohen, 1988), 
and used a 1-β error probability of .8 as is convention in power analyses (Mazen, 
Hemmasi, & Lewis 1985). To my knowledge no literature has examine the effect 
of a NAVON task on the experience of meaning, and I want to be sure to have 
adequate power to detect effects that are present. The results of the power analysis 
suggested 80 participants.   
Participants completed an experimental manipulation in person in a 
psychology lab, and then completed several survey tasks. The manipulation was 
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designed to place participants in a condition that induces either a state of concrete 
or abstract construal. Participants received partial fulfillment of their psychology 
research participation course credit in return for completing the study. All 
participants 18 years of age and above were eligible to participate in the study.  
Procedure and Materials  
After entering the lab and providing consent, participants completed a 
construal manipulation (the NAVON task; Navon, 1977) to induce states of 
abstract or concrete construal.  
After the NAVON manipulation, participants completed the measures of 
meaning provided by moral and conventional standards used in Study 1. If it is 
the case that construal level facilitates coherence and transcendence differentially, 
the NAVON manipulation of concrete construal should increase the extent to 
which people endorse morality and conventionality as sources of coherence and 
transcendence. 
 Construal level manipulation. Participants first completed an 
experimental manipulation, the NAVON task (Navon, 1977) to induce a state of 
concrete or abstract construal. In a NAVON task, participants were shown large 
letters that are made up of smaller letters (i.e., a series of compound letters; see 
Appendix J). These compound letters were presented to participants on a 
computer screen one at a time, and participants were asked to press a key to 
indicate whether or not there was a specific large compound letter on the screen 
(e.g., an E, as depicted on the left side of Appendix J) or if the small letters 
making up that letter were a specific letter (e.g., an E, as depicted on the right side 
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of Appendix J). Participants completed all trials looking for either the presence of 
a large compound letter (an induction of abstract construal), or a small letter 
making up a compound letter (an induction of concrete construal). This variable 
constitutes a between subjects manipulation.  
 Conventional and moral standards create coherence and 
transcendence measures. Following the construal level manipulation, 
participants completed one of the same two measures of the extent to which moral 
or conventional standards create coherence and transcendence used in Study 1 on 
the same response scales used in Study 1 (See Appendices A, B, and C). In Study 
2, participants did not write about their moral or conventional standards, but 
moved immediately to responding to the items assessing the extent to which 
moral or conventional standards provide coherence or transcendence to prevent 
the manipulation from wearing off before participants had a chance to respond to 
these items. The instructions for Study 2 are labeled as such in the Appendixes. 
 Demographics. Finally, participants responded to a series of demographic 
measures, such as age, sex, political orientation, income, and religious orientation 
(see Appendix I). 
Study 2 Results 
Pilot Test 
 As in Study 1, I first tested whether or not participants differentiated 
between their moral and conventional beliefs in terms of their ratings of 
objectivity and universality while describing them in writing. Participants wrote 
about their moral or conventional standards to provide an idea of the kinds of 
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things that came to their minds when responding to the prompt. I examined 
whether or not people who wrote about morals rated them as more objective than 
conventions. Again, the results presented in Table 3 show that participants 
consistently rated their morals as more objective, universal, and emotionally 
charged than their conventions.  
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Table 3: Results from Study 2 Pretest 
 
 t Mmoral SD Mconvention SD 
I think that other people should follow the [conventions/morals] I just wrote 
about in all situations. 
3.07** 4.64 1.68 3.00 1.82 
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are no more important than any 
of my other beliefs. 
2.80** 3.59 1.47 4.76 1.26 
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are sacred to me. 1.06 4.45 2.04 3.81 1.97 
Even if it were against the law, I would follow the [conventions/morals] I just 
wrote about. 
2.92** 4.95 1.68 3.33 1.96 
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about represent what I think is 
absolutely right or wrong. 
1.49 4.91 1.85 4.05 1.94 
There is nothing special about the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about. 1.57 2.00 .93 2.62 1.60 
I would be willing to change the [conventions/morals] that I just wrote about 
if I was in a situation in which other people wanted me to. 
3.47**
* 
2.41 1.71 4.14 1.56 
When people violate the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about I do not 
usually get angry with them. 
2.13* 3.86 1.36 2.81 1.86 
I feel that the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are sacred. 1.91+ 4.41 1.74 3.38 1.80 
I would change the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about if I were in 
another country where people have different beliefs. 
5.24**
* 
2.55 1.57 5.05 1.56 
Note: Participants in Study 2 rated either their conventional or moral standards. The wording of each item either asked 
about conventional or moral standards. +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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To test Hypothesis I-III, I ran a 2 (Construal Level: Concrete vs. Abstract) 
X 2 (Type of Standard: Conventional vs. Moral) X 2 (Dimension of Meaning: 
Coherence vs. Transcendence) mixed ANOVA, with Dimension of Meaning as a 
within subjects factor. 
Hypothesis I 
 To examine the idea that moral standards may create more meaning than 
conventional standards, I examined the main effect of type of standard. No main 
effect emerged, and Hypothesis I was not supported F(1,109) = .53, p = .47, ηp2 
= .004 (see Figure 4 for the results of Hypothesis I, II, and III). 
Hypothesis II 
 To test whether or not inducing concrete construal provides more 
coherence than transcendence, and inducing states of abstract construal provide 
more transcendence than coherence, I examined the interaction between 
dimension of meaning and construal level. No interaction emerged F(1, 109) 
= .03, p = .87, ηp2 <.001, and Hypothesis II was not supported.  
Hypothesis III 
 To examine whether or any interaction between dimension of meaning and 
construal level was moderated by type of standard, I examined the three-way 
interaction between dimension of meaning, construal level, and type of standard. 
No three-way interaction was present F(1, 109) = 2.20 , p =.14, ηp2 = .02. Thus, 
there was no support for Hypothesis III.
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Figure 5: Results from Study 2. 
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Study 2 Discussion 
There was no support for any of the Study 2 hypotheses. With regards to 
Hypothesis I, there was one major difference in the manipulation of type of 
standard that may have contributed to the lack of a main effect for type of 
standard: Participants did not write about their moral or conventional standards. In 
Study 1, participants were required to reflect and write about these standards, 
which most likely created a more powerful reminder of what participants’ moral 
and conventional standards are. In addition, in writing about their moral and 
conventional standards, participants in Study 1 were most likely able to make 
concrete connections between the way their moral standards make them feel in 
terms of coherence and transcendence. The prompt in Study 2 may have served as 
a reminder of participants’ moral and conventional standards, but may have only 
resulted in vague, nebulous, or weak recollections of these standards for 
participants. In addition, without the structure of a writing prompt, participants 
may have responded to the prompts while thinking about both morals and 
conventions, which may have lead them rate both conventional and moral 
standards as creating relatively high levels of coherence and transcendence. A 
lack of a focus on specific moral and conventional standards could explain the 
lack of the predicted main effect of moral standards. Participants simply may not 
have reflected on their standards clearly enough to make strong differentiations 
between them.   
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The lack of an interaction between type of standard and construal level as 
posited in Hypothesis 2 may have been because of the nature of the construal 
manipulation used in Study 2. The NAVON task is a visual task, and such a task 
may not have strong associations with participants’ conceptual and emotional 
sense of concrete and abstract standards as they relate to meaning. 
Finally, the lack of a three way-interaction between dimension of meaning, 
construal level, and type of standard may have been caused by a combination of 
the factors that may underlie the lack of support for Hypotheses I and II. If it is 
truly the case that the type of standard manipulation did not lead participants to 
think clearly about their moral and conventional standards, and the NAVON task 
did not affect construal level in the predicted fashion, then it would be unlikely 
that any interaction would be present between these factors.  
In the future, it may be helpful to do two things to increase the power of 
the study manipulation and increase the effectiveness of the construal 
manipulation. First, it may be helpful to ask participants to actually write about 
the conventional and moral standards they thought about in Study 2. Second, it 
may be helpful to devise a more powerful and also direct manipulation of 
construal level. 
There are probably numerous ways in which this could be done. In terms 
of the standards manipulation, participants could simply be asked to write about 
their standards. In terms of the construal manipulations, participants could be 
asked to describe the ways in which safety and predictability in the immediate 
environment are important to them. This could be embedded in the type of 
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standards manipulation writing activity itself. Alternatively, a measure such as the 
BIF could be used as an individual difference variable at the beginning of the 
study as a proxy for a construal manipulation. I would expect that participants in 
low levels of chronic construal would find much more coherence in their moral 
standards compared to their conventional standards compared to transcendence, 
with only slightly more transcendence being experienced from morals compared 
to conventions in this group. For participants operating in high levels of chronic 
construal, I would expect them to report their moral standards as much greater 
creators of transcendence compared to conventional standards, and to create 
slightly more coherence than conventional standards. 
Study 3 Overview 
The purpose of Study 3 was to expand upon Studies 1 and 2 by 
demonstrating that moral standards are not only endorsed as more effective in 
providing meaning than conventional standards, but at compensating for threats to 
coherence and transcendence. Study 3 also expanded on previous meaning theory 
(e.g., Heine et al., 2006. By allowing me to examine whether or not people prefer 
moral standards to conventional standards to compensate for threats to meaning. 
An additional goal of Study 3 was to test the prediction that people are especially 
likely to endorse morality after threats to transcendence compared to threats to 
coherence.  
Thus, in Study 3, I gave participants the opportunity to endorse the extent 
to which they feel it is important to follow moral and conventional standards after 
a threat to coherence, transcendence, or neutral feedback about coherence or 
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transcendence. The meaning threat consists of a fake personality test made up of 
the BIF, SOC, MLQ subscale, and NFC scales from Study 1 and feedback telling 
participants their lives will either be devoid of coherence, devoid of transcendence, 
or normal in terms of coherence or transcendence. Following the feedback, 
participants rated how important it is to them to follow conventional and moral 
standards. Using this methodology, I was able to specifically examine how people 
respond to threats to dimensions of meaning by focusing on conventional or moral 
standards. By allowing people to compensate for threats to meaning using moral 
or conventional standards, I was able to test which type of standard (i.e., 
conventionality vs. morality) people prefer to use to compensate for threats to 
different dimensions of meaning. This investigation builds on previous research 
not only by examining the role of threats to dimensions of meaning in meaning 
compensation, but by assessing whether moral standards are an especially 
effective tool to compensate for lost meaning (particularly transcendence) 
compared to conventional standards.  
Study 3 Hypotheses 
Study 3 was based on three primary hypotheses, the expected patterns 
reflected by these hypotheses are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Hypothesis I. I predict a main effect, such that people will endorse the 
importance of moral standards more than conventional standards in 
general. 
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Hypothesis II. I predict a two-way interaction between type of standard 
and threat condition.  People should endorse the importance of moral 
standards compared to conventional standards to a greater extent after 
threats to meaning compared to no threats.  
 
Hypothesis III. I expect, the abovementioned two-way interaction to be 
qualified by dimension of threat. When coherence is threatened, people 
will endorse moral standards as more important than conventional 
standards, and when transcendence is threatened, this pattern will be 
especially pronounced. Under neutral feedback regarding both types of 
standards, moral standards should be rated as slightly more important than 
conventional standards. These hypotheses are represented in Figure 3. 
 
Study 3 Method 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were 128 undergraduates from DePaul University’s 
undergraduate psychology subject pool (Men = 50; Women = 78). The study used 
a 2 (Threat Condition: Threatened vs. Not Threatened) X 2 (Dimension of 
Meaning: Coherence vs. Transcendence) X 2 (Type of Standard: Conventional vs. 
Moral) mixed ANOVA, with the third factor as a within subjects factor. To 
determine the number of subjects, I used G*Power version 3.1 specifying an F 
test for a mixed-ANOVA with one 2 level within-subjects factor and four between 
subject measurement groups. I specified a small effect size to be conservative 
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when computing the power analysis as the measures have not been tested in 
previous literature (ηp2 = .04; Cohen, 1988), and used a 1-β error probability of .8 
as is convention in power analyses (Mazen, Hemmasi, Lewis 1985). This analysis 
yielded the same recommended 80 participants as in Study 2. 
 Participants completed an experimental manipulation in a laboratory 
setting and then responded to survey measures assessing the extent to which they 
endorse morality and conventionality as providing coherence and transcendence. 
Participants received partial fulfillment of their psychology research participation 
course credit in return for completing the study. All participants were 18 years of 
age and above.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants entered the lab, completed informed consent, and then 
completed an experimental manipulation. The manipulation involved telling 
participants that they will be lacking in aspects of life representing coherence or 
transcendence, or that they will be relatively normal in these dimensions. This 
manipulation allowed me to examine the extent to which people endorse moral 
and conventional standards in response to threats to the coherence and 
transcendent dimensions of meaning, as well as neutral feedback. After the 
manipulation, participants completed a manipulation check to assess whether or 
not they had accurately remembered the feedback they were given. 
 Meaning threat manipulation. Participants first completed an 
experimental manipulation designed to threaten either coherence or transcendence. 
As part of the experimental manipulation, all participants, regardless of which 
	   90	  
condition they were in, were told that they were going to take a test used by 
credible institutions that strongly predicts a variety of life outcomes, and that we 
would be examining how scores on this measure are related to social behavior. In 
one condition (i.e., the coherence threat condition) participants were told that we 
were specifically interested in examining the probability that people’s lives will 
be secure, predictable, and organized. In the other, the transcendence threat 
condition, participants were told that we were specifically interested in examining 
the likelihood that a person’s life will be fulfilling, purposeful, engaging. The first 
part of this manipulation (i.e., the prompts participants read before they took the 
fake personality test), and can be found in Appendix K. 
 Following the initial prompt, participants responded to the “GAP” 
inventory, which was actually composed of a set of the same scales used to test, 
discriminant, and criterion validity from Study 1 (i.e., the Behavior Identification 
Form, the short Need for Closure Scale, The SOC, and the MLQ). These items 
gave the appearance of a personality test. 
 After completing the faux personality inventory, participants received the 
faux results of their inventory. Participants received either threatening or neutral 
feedback corresponding to coherence (if they read the coherence prompt) or 
transcendence (if they read the transcendence prompt). In the coherence threat 
condition, participants received feedback showing that they would most likely 
live a life low in security, predictability, and organization (see Appendix L). In 
the transcendence threat condition, participants received feedback showing that 
they would most likely live a life low in engagement, purpose, and fulfillment 
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(see Appendix L). In the neutral coherence condition, participants received 
information that they would be relatively normal compared to the rest of the 
population in terms of these attributes (see Appendix L).             
 Manipulation check. Participants completed a manipulation check after 
the threat manipulation to assess whether or not they paid attention to the 
manipulation, and whether or not the manipulation did in fact threaten coherence 
(in the coherence threat condition) or transcendence (in the transcendence threat 
condition) compared to the neutral conditions (see Appendix M). Participants 
responded to scales asking how likely they were told it is they will live a coherent 
or transcendent life, and questions about how likely it is these things will actually 
happen.   
Importance of moral and conventional standards. Following the threat 
manipulation, participants rated the importance of morality vs. conventionality 
(See Appendix N). These measures were based on previous research on moral 
centrality and motivation (Krettenauer, 2011) and moral chronicity (which 
assesses traits often associated with morality; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 
2005), and are adapted in the spirit of assessing the extent to which moral vs. 
conventional standards were important to participants.  
Search for meaning. At the end of the study, directly before the 
demographics, participants responded to the search for meaning scale for 
exploratory purposes. This scale is a subscale of the MLQ that examines 
participants’ desire to find meaning in life ( see Appendix O; Steger et al., 2006). 
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Behavioral measure of desire for coherence and transcendence. 
Participants completed a behavioral measure after the threat manipulation to 
assess whether or not the manipulation did in fact threaten coherence (in the 
coherence threat condition) or transcendence (in the transcendence threat 
condition) compared to the neutral conditions. The behavioral measure told 
participants that they would complete a training module of their choice at the end 
of the study. They were given the option to choose between a training module 
about how to live a coherent life, or a module about how to lead a transcendent 
life (see Appendix P). Participants should prefer the coherence module compared 
to the transcendence module after the coherence threat compared to all other 
conditions, and prefer the transcendence module compared to the coherence 
module compared to all other conditions.  
Demographics. Finally, participants responded to a series of demographic 
measures, such as age, sex, political orientation, income, and religious orientation 
and religious strength (see Appendix I). 
Study 3 Results 
Manipulation Check  
I began the Study 3 analyses by examining which participants had 
adequately understood and remembered the percentages they were assigned in the 
experimental feedback conditions. In the threat condition, I removed any 
participants that rated themselves at or above the 50% mark on any of the 
indicators of coherence or transcendence. In the control condition, I removed any 
participants rating themselves below the 50% mark on any of the indicators of 
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coherence or transcendence. This resulted in the removal of 9 participants, leaving 
the final N of 128.  
Hypothesis I 
 To test Hypothesis I, I ran a 2 (Threat Condition: Threatened vs. Not 
Threatened) X 2 (Dimension of Meaning: Coherence vs. Transcendence) X 2 
(Type of Standard: Conventional vs. Moral) mixed ANOVA, with the third factor 
as a within subjects factor. Consistent with Hypothesis I, there was a main effect 
of type of standard, such that participants endorsed moral standards to a greater 
extent than conventional standards F(1, 124) = 235.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .66 (see 
Figure 7). No other effects emerged (all ps > .35).   
Hypothesis II 
 To examine Hypothesis II, I examined the two-way interaction between 
type of standard and threat condition. Contrary to Hypothesis II, there was no 
interaction between type of standard and threat condition F(1, 124) = .18, p = .67, 
ηp
2 = .001. 
Hypothesis III 
 To examine Hypothesis III, I examined the three-way interaction between 
type of standard, threat condition, and dimension of meaning. Contrary to 
Hypothesis III, no interaction was present F(1, 124) = .96, p = .96, ηp2  < .001.    
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Figure 6: Results from Study 3 
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Behavioral Measure 
To examine the behavioral measure, I coded participants’ choices to 
complete a module coaching life “organization and planning” as 0, and a module 
about how to live with “purpose and meaning” as 1. I then regressed this measure 
on the threat condition and type of standard variables (see Figure 8). Counter to 
expectations, a main effect of threat condition, χ2(1) =  3.72, p = .05, 
demonstrated that participants were more likely to prefer the module about 
purpose in the threat condition than in the control condition, but no other effects 
emerged.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Results of Study 3 behavioral analysis. 
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Study 3 Discussion 
There was very little support for the Study 3 hypotheses. The only 
hypothesis to receive any support was Hypothesis I, demonstrating that people 
endorsed their moral standards more than their conventional standards. This 
finding is in line with previous work demonstrating that morals are experienced 
more strongly than conventions, as well as with a sense of objectivity and 
universality. This finding is also in line with my theoretical perspective that moral 
standards provide a greater sense of meaning than conventional standards (the 
moral primacy hypothesis). To the extent that morals are experienced more 
strongly and provide more coherence and transcendence than conventional 
standards, people should endorse their importance more strongly than conventions. 
 There may be a reason reasons for the lack of support for Hypothesis II. 
Although participants did have a good recollection of the results of the GAP, I do 
not have a measure explicitly addressing how threatening their feedback was to 
them. It may be the case that participants believed the results of their inventory, 
but did not feel particularly threatened by them. Furthermore, the lack of an 
interaction for the behavioral measure suggests that people were not in the 
mindset to seek coherence and transcendence in the predicted fashion based on 
the manipulation. Participants under threat were more likely to want to learn 
about how to find purpose compared to security, but the type of meaning sought 
after did not change based on type of threat.  
  The Study 3 Results may also be explained by self-affirmation. To the 
extent that the measures of moral and conventional importance served as a way 
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for participants to affirm their sense of meaning and worth following threats, they 
may have wiped out the effect of the threat manipulation. An examination of the 
scale might suggest that some items allowed participants to affirm their moral 
characteristics (e.g. trustworthiness). Research on self-affirmation (Sherman et al., 
2013) suggests that self-affirmation may decrease the impact of threatening 
constructs like stereotypes, and it may be the case that this applies to meaning 
threats as well. If this is true, the lack of results in Study 3 may be due at least in 
part to self-affirmation.  
Although unexpected, this pattern of results may also not be particularly 
surprising based on the asymmetry hypothesis. When participants are threatened 
with a lack of coherence or transcendence, they might seek transcendence to 
alleviate either type of threat. In addition, participants in the control condition did 
not receive a particularly optimistic assessment from the results of their test 
regarding their likelihood of achieving coherence or transcendence. The highest 
probability of finding meaning through predictability or purpose was below the 75 
percent mark for all aspects of meaning in the control condition, and in one case 
(predictability and fulfillment) it was closer to 50 percent. Hence, participants 
may have felt slightly threatened in the control condition. It may be useful in 
future studies to give feedback that is more positive in the control condition, as all 
participants may have been equally threatened in both conditions. It would also be 
useful to add a manipulation check to assess how threatened participants were by 
the feedback.      
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With regards to Hypothesis III, a potential reason for the lack of results 
could be that people simply do not look to their moral or conventional standards 
(or at least alter them), when they are threatened with incoherence or a lack of 
transcendence. People may have a static level with which they experience their 
moral and conventional standards as important, and they may not increase the 
importance of these standards following threats. However, this does not mean that 
people do not focus more on conventions or morals to a greater extent for more 
specific purposes (i.e. creating coherence and transcendence after threat). If I had 
asked participants to rate the extent to which they think their conventional and 
moral standards are important for creating predictability and providing purpose, 
more nuanced patterns may have emerged. 
Despite the lack of overall support for the Study 3 hypotheses, the results 
of Study 3 still shed additional light on the idea that people experience their moral 
standards as more important than their conventional standards. This information 
provides a conceptual replication for the results of Study 1 in support of the moral 
primacy hypothesis, and suggests that moral standards are a powerful part of 
peoples’ lives.  
General Discussion  
The overall purpose of the work presented here was to examine the idea that 
moral standards are more effective at creating meaning, especially in the form of 
transcendence, than conventional standards. Overall there are several take home 
messages and suggestions for future research that can be culled from the present 
investigation. First, there is evidence across all three studies providing a 
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conceptual replication of the moral conviction literature demonstrating that moral 
standards are experienced with a greater sense of objectivity and universality than 
conventional standards. This evidence also provides support for the moral 
primacy hypothesis. In addition, the current investigation is one of the first to 
explicitly measure the feelings of objectivity and universality accompanying both 
moral and conventional standards. This new conceptual replication of the extant 
literature helps to both provide replication and clarity to research and theory 
suggesting moral standards are experienced with a greater sense of objectivity and 
universality than social conventions. Second, the present research provides initial 
evidence that people experience meaning across the dimensions of coherence and 
transcendence, and that moral and conventional standards are imbued with 
different levels of these dimensions of meaning (see Study 1 interaction). These 
findings add additional depth to both the literature on the structure of feelings of 
meaningfulness, as well as the small but growing literature on the relationship 
between morality and meaning. Third, the failure of the current investigation to 
effectively manipulate the extent to which types of standards provide coherence 
and transcendence may provide hints about how to design a better future test of 
the relationship between construal level and meaning, as well as types of 
standards. Fourth, the failure of the present investigation to alter the coherence 
and transcendence provided by moral and conventional standards may provide 
additional insight into which types of threat manipulations are more or less 
effective in altering the meaning provided by types of standards. These issues are 
described in detail in the subsections below. 
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Conceptual Replication of Previous Findings 
 The results of the current investigation provide a strong conceptual 
replication across studies of the extant literature suggesting that moral standards 
are experienced as more objective and universal than other types of standards. 
This evidence is borne out in both the Study 1 and 2 pilot tests, and in the overall 
results of Study 3, which demonstrate that people rate the moral standards are 
more objective, universal, and emotionally laden than their conventional 
standards. Previous theory and research suggest that people experience their 
morals more powerfully than other types of standards, but this literature rarely (if 
ever) included explicit tests of the objectivity and universality of conventional and 
moral standards. The present investigation provides additional credence and 
empirical tests to the back up the idea that moral standards are experienced as 
more objective and universal than conventional standards.   
 In addition to providing credence to, and replication of, past literature, the 
present studies measure moral and conventional standards using conceptually-
similar, but non-overlapping items to measure moral standards. Previous literature 
has examined moral conviction concerning a variety of issues. The current study 
examined moral standards using a wide set of items, but allowed participants to 
choose the issues they feel are most relevant to their moral and conventional 
standards in the writing prompts. In combination, these factors allow the present 
research to examine the objectivity and universality associated with moral and 
conventional standards using a wide range of items and a less restricted focus on 
specific issues.     
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Insight Into the Structure of Meaning  
 The current investigation also provides potential insight into the nature 
and structure of meaning. The correlations between the scales of coherence and 
transcendence provided by conventional and moral standards with the convergent 
and discriminant validity scales did not generally match the study hypotheses. The 
correlations between need for order and structure, open-mindedness, discomfort 
with ambiguity, and preference for predictability with coherence and 
transcendence were equal. However the correlations do seem to demonstrate a 
general tendency for the BIF, the SOC transcendence items, and the MLQ, to 
relate at least slightly more powerfully to transcendence than to coherence. This 
may provide partial support for the hypothesis that the transcendence items should 
relate more strongly than the convention items to measures tapping into a sense of 
purpose. This provides convergent validity for the transcendence items. That 
being said, the remainder of the scales, proposed to tap more into coherence than 
transcendence, appears to correlate equally with the coherence scale. Although 
this was not predicted, there may be a reason for it based in the current theoretical 
perspective. I propose that achieving a sense of coherence may not increase 
feelings of transcendence as strongly as feelings of transcendence may also feed 
into a sense of coherence. To the extent that this is true, it might be expected that 
people who experience their conventional and moral standards as providing 
transcendence may also have or seek greater levels of coherence. 
 The results of the current investigation did not provide particularly strong 
evidence for the existence of two distinct dimension of meaning, but more work 
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should be done to further examine the potential existence of dimensions of 
meaning. The importance of both coherence and transcendence seems intuitive to 
many. Philosophical examinations of meaning even contain aspects of meaning 
that map onto the dimensions of coherence and transcendence (Glover, 2012); 
therefore, it is premature to dismiss the multidimensionality of meaning based on 
a limited number of findings.   
 Conversely, it is also possible that the results presented here are not in fact 
a methodological artifact, and that meaning does not consist of two dimensions. 
The correlations between the coherence and transcendence scales were extremely 
high, suggesting that there may be no true demarcation between dimensions of 
meaning. It could be the case that people feel their lives have a greater purpose 
when their lives are orderly, that their lives are orderly when they have purpose, 
or there may be a reciprocal relationship between feelings of order and purpose. 
However, it may also be the case that meaning is a one-dimensional construct, 
which would preclude any relationship between the non-existing dimensions of 
coherence and transcendence. If this is the case it would have strong implications 
for the extant theoretical perspective. For example, if meaning consists of only 
one dimension, it may be the case the moral standards simply provide more 
meaning than conventional standards, but not in the nuanced way proposed here.   
Meaning and its Relationship to Types of Standards 
 Across two out of the three present studies, there was support for the 
hypothesis that moral standards provide a greater sense of meaning, including 
both coherence and transcendence, than conventional standards. This finding 
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provides an important bridge between the morality and meaning literatures, and 
builds upon each theoretically. The finding that moral standards, which are 
experienced as more objective and universal than conventional standards and are 
experienced as providing more meaning overall provides initial support for the 
idea that the characteristics of morals provide powerful meaning. Not only do 
these results suggest that morals create meaning broadly, but they suggest that 
moral standards are the most powerful predictor of the dimension of meaning, 
transcendence, which is expected to provide a broad and universal sense of 
purpose. These patterns are borne out in the Study 1 interaction. These results are 
supportive of the study hypotheses suggesting that the objective and universal 
properties of moral standards contribute to feelings of transcendence. To provide 
a more explicit examination of these ideas, future studies could assess whether or 
not the interaction found in Study 1 can be explained by the objective and 
universal properties of moral standards by including measures explicitly asking 
participants about these moral characteristics.  
In addition, it may be the case that the delineation between moral and 
conventional standards is not absolute in reality or in the present study. An 
examination of Table 1 for example demonstrates that there were not ceiling 
effects for the objectivity and universality of the moral standards participants 
described, and participants did attribute some degree of objectivity and 
universality to their conventional standards. This suggests that morals and 
conventions may operate on a continuum, with extreme moral standards as 
absolutely objective and universal, and conventional standards seen as completely 
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subjective and situational. In addition it could also be the case that as 
conventional standards are seen as more objective and universal over time (say if 
the strength of one’s beliefs increases) that conventions may become moral 
standards. Hence, the present results may be seen as representing the differences 
in meaning provided by standards, as they are experienced as more or less moral. 
 It may also be the case that moral standards are created when conventional 
standards are imbued with meaning. For example if a person experiences the task 
of guests taking their shoes off at the door as completely non-indicative of the 
guests’ level of respect for the person’s house, they may not experience it as a 
meaningful act, and not become angry if guests forget to take off their shoes. 
However, if the person begins to derive a sense of meaning and respect from the 
act of removing shoes, it may become moralized. More work is still yet to be done 
to determine the antecedents of moral and conventional standards. 
Manipulating and Measuring Moral Standards 
 The present studies may also provide useful information to take into 
account in future investigation including the manipulation and measurement of 
moral and conventional standards. A comparison of the results of Studies 1 and 2 
suggests it may be more useful to provide participants with the ability to focus on 
specific moral issues when responding to questions about their moral standards. 
The stark contrast between the ratings of coherence and transcendence provided 
by moral and conventional standards between Studies 1 and 2 suggests that 
participants may not have had a clear idea in mind of how their morals and 
conventions provided meaning in Study 2. This very well may have been a result 
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of the fact that participants in Study 1 wrote explicitly about their moral or 
conventional standards, whereas participants in Study 2 did not. Previous work on 
moral conviction (e.g. Skitka et al., 2005) has required participants to respond to 
measures of moral conviction and attitude strength that pertain to specific policies. 
When looking at this literature and the results of Study 1 in the present work, it 
appears that only asking participants to consider their morals and conventions 
when responding to prompts may be too nebulous, as the results of Study 2 do not 
replicate the patterns from Study 1, or conceptually replicate previous literature.  
 Similarly, future studies examining the relation of construal level to 
dimensions of meaning and types of standards may need to use a more targeted 
construal level manipulation. Such a manipulation might include asking 
participants to focus specifically on the way that their moral and conventional 
standards enable them to either accomplish basic daily tasks, such as predicting 
the environment and feelings good about things they are immediately involved in, 
or providing a broader sense of structure and purpose over the long term. Such a 
manipulation may create a more tangible connection between the level of 
construal in which a person is operating, and the sense of coherence and 
transcendence provided by their moral and conventional standards. If it is difficult 
to devise a manipulation to this effect, it may also suffice to use individual 
difference measures, such as the BIF, as independent variables that could be used 
to test a moderating role of trait construal level on the sense of coherence and 
transcendence provided by standards.    
Threatening Meaning and Focus on Moral Standards 
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 The results of Study 3 may provide insight into the manner in which future 
research could threaten meaning with the goal of impacting levels of meaning 
provided by moral and conventional standards. To the extent that specific feelings 
towards policies, behaviors, ideologies, and other specific beliefs and values are 
imbued with a sense of moral conviction, it may be more effective to threaten 
specific attitudes or values when trying to impact how much meaning people 
derive from their conventional and moral standards. Participants may not have 
experienced any connection between the threat feedback they received and the 
moral and conventional standards scales, a limitation that might be remedied by 
altering the structure of the moral and conventional standards scales. Participants 
could be given the same threat they received in Study 3, but the items assessing 
moral and conventional standards could be re-worked to ask participants about 
how much predictability and purpose their morals and conventions provide them. 
It may even be best to use the measures of coherent and transcendent moral and 
conventional standards from Studies 1 and 2 in place of the scales from Study 3.  
 Finally, it may be the case that it is simply very difficult, if not impossible 
to change how much people focus on moral and conventional standards, and feel 
that each is important, via meaning threats. This may be especially true of moral 
standards, as they are experienced as objective and universal.  
Further Examination of Asymmetrical Compensation 
 Another theoretical issue that would be worth examining in greater detail 
in future studies is the assertion of the asymmetry hypothesis that it may be 
difficult to compensate for threats to transcendence by reestablishing coherence. 
	   107	  
In Voltaire’s Candide, the protagonist expresses to Dr. Pangloss the idea that “we 
must take care of our own garden” to render life livable. This observation was 
made after realizing that a humble Turk had a more meaningful life from tending 
his own small plot of land than those who have great wealth and are involved in 
violence and deceit.  
 From this example one might infer that one might try to get one’s life in 
order after their sense of transcendence is threatened, and that this may serve as a 
springboard for the recreation of transcendence. There may be circumstances in 
which this is the case. The integrated model of meaning suggests, as does the 
meaning maintenance model, that people will choose the most direct route to 
restore meaning. However, in some circumstances, a person might feel that their 
life is devoid of transcendence, and attempt to shore up order in their environment 
to serve as scaffolding that can be used to create new systems of transcendence. If 
one loses a loved one for example, they may throw themselves into a job while 
they process their loss and eventually recreate feelings of transcendence. There 
may be fewer instances in which this occurs than when threats to coherence are 
compensated for by seeking transcendence, as some losses of transcendence may 
be too great to overcome with an immediate sense of consistency.           
Conclusions 
 The results of the current investigation contain many useful insights into 
the nature and structure of both feelings of meaningfulness, and moral and 
conventional standards. These insights can help direct future research examining 
the way that people experience meaning, and how moral and conventional 
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standards provide a sense of meaning in life in a multitude of ways. Some 
possible future directions of this work could be to replicate the results of Study 1 
and further develop the measures of moral and conventional coherence and 
transcendence to more closely map onto expected dimensions of coherence and 
transcendence across standards. Future work should also develop better construal 
and threat manipulations to assess the impact of construal and threat on types of 
standards. This combination of steps has the potential to have an impact on the 
literature examining both morals and meaning. Overall, the current investigation 
suggests that moral standards are extremely important to people and provide them 
with a sense of predictability and purpose in life. To the extent that people desire 
a sense of meaning, it may be useful to them to focus on their moral standards. 
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Appendix A 
Conventional Standards Prompt 
 
All people follow conventions in one form or another. Conventions are standard 
practices that are commonly followed in a particular society. Conventions can 
vary from place to place, and when a person experiences a standard as 
conventional, they see it as applying differently from one society to another based 
on the customs of the society in question and the social situation at hand.  
 
For example, in some countries, people drive on the right side of the road, but in 
others, they drive on the left side of the road. Some cultures eat with chopsticks 
and others eat with forks and spoons, and in some countries it is customary to 
consult family members when selecting a marriage partner, but in other countries 
it is not. The people that engage in these acts often see them as conventional, 
meaning that they follow them only because it is the norm to do so. As a result, 
people do not see the standards of behavior described by their conventions as 
absolutely right or wrong, and will often adjust their conventions when in 
different situations. Despite this, people can get annoyed or offended when others 
violate their conventional norms.  
 
We would like you to please spend a few minutes to write a paragraph about some 
of the conventions you frequently follow that fit the description of conventions 
given in the first paragraph above. Please try to think of the conventions you 
abide by on a daily basis and give an example of how they affect your behavior on 
a day-to-day basis. 
 
Example Responses From Participants: 
 
• I walk on the right side of the sidewalk and expect others to do so also. i become annoyed 
if someone is walking towards me on the right side. also if two people are walking 
towards me on the sidewalk, i expect the  people to walk single file when they pass me. i 
should not have to try to slide by the two of them walking towards me. 
• I use a fork when I'm eating anything with noodles. I drive on the right side of the road. I 
go to church on Sundays in my local neighborhood. I watch sports on Sundays as well. I 
throw out the trash on Mondays. 
• I greet people at work each day though I really do not want to. It would be rude to not 
greet them. I thank co-workers for helping me even though they get paid to do so. When 
it is someone's birthday I tell them happy birthday. 
• I typically wear a shirt and jeans when I go out to run errands. Other people in other 
cultures might wear dresses, or very modest clothing or some other type of clothing. My 
clothing affects my behavior in that it's comfortable, I'm used to it, and it's casual. 
• A conventional set of rules that  I abide with is sending my children to public school.  I 
use to homeschool, which is not the norm for my area.  Now I get them up at a certain 
time and have them ready for the school bus by a certain time. When they get home I 
have them do their homework and review any notes from their teacher. 
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Appendix B 
Moral Standards Prompt 
 
 
All people follow morals in one form or another. Morals are beliefs and standards 
that a person sees as representing what is absolutely right or wrong. This means 
that morals are experienced as representing what is absolutely right or wrong in 
all societies and situations regardless of the laws or customs of a given place.  
 
For example, some people feel that everyone has the right to move from one 
economic class to another through hard work, and would think it unjust to deny 
opportunities for success based on arbitrary things like gender or skin color. Some 
people adhere to specific diets because they think eating certain foods (e.g., pork) 
is immoral, and others feel morally invested in political issues like gun control or 
same-sex marriage. Because morals are seen as absolutely right or wrong 
regardless of the context, people are deeply invested in their morals, and feel 
angry at, and disgusted by, people who violate their morals. 
 
We would like you to please spend a few minutes to write a paragraph about some 
of your own morals that fit the description of morals given in the first paragraph 
above. Please try to think of the morals you abide by on a daily basis and give an 
example of how they affect your behavior on a day-to-day basis. 
 
Example Responses From Participants: 
 
• Day to day I try to be as honest and free about how I think and the things that I do. So no 
matter how controversial, I always speak my opinion on the matter. I like to think that I 
have independent opinions and I don't go along with the crowd. 
• I believe that morally wrong things consist of things that intensionally harm another 
person emotionally or physically. All people should have the same opportunities; whether 
this be the right to marry whoever they want or the same job opportunity everyone should 
be given the same right. If these rights that do not harm anyone else are prohibited it is 
morally wrong. 
• A few of the morals with which I conduct my life include the "haves" helping the "have 
nots", humane treatment of animals, people working together for the good of the larger 
group rather than just themselves and our responsibility to protect and nurture our 
environment. 
• I believe in man and woman getting married and having a family. I believe that it is 
inmoral to have same sex marriage. That is my opinion, I do not talk to homosexuals, but 
it is my moral belief. I try to treat everyone the same. 
• People have a right to self-determination, to living a life free of violence, to adequate 
food. Not stealing, being honest about my work hours. BDS movement. 
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Appendix C 
 
Moral and Conventional Coherence and Transcendence Scale 
 
Study 1 Conventional Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the 
following statements about the CONVENTIONS you just wrote about using the 
scales provided. 
 
In general, the  CONVENTIONS I follow in my daily life… 
 
Study 1 Moral Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the following 
statements about the MORALS you just wrote about using the scales provided. 
 
In general, the  MORALS I follow in my daily life… 
 
Study 2 Conventional Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the 
following statements about the CONVENTIONS you follow on a day-to-day 
basis. 
 
In general, the  CONVENTIONS I follow in my daily life… 
 
Study 2 Moral Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the following 
statements about the MORALS you follow on a day-to-day basis. 
 
In general, the  MORALS I follow in my daily life… 
 
 
1          2          3          4         5          6          7 
                                   not at all                                                        very much 
CC Enable me to clearly determine why people 
behave the way they do. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CC Enable me to deal with challenging 
situations. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CC Enable me to avoid dangerous places. 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CC Enable me to avoid unpredictable situations. 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TC Make me to feel that my day to day routine 
contributes to something greater than myself. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TC Enable me to understand the greater purpose 
for doing the many small things that I do 
everyday. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TC Enable me to make sense of many specific, 
confusing situations. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TC Give life’s challenges a sense of ultimate 
purpose. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CB Enable me to fit in to my social groups. 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CB Help me function well in the groups I am a 
part of. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
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CB Enable me to respond appropriately to people 
in my social groups. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CB Allow me to understand what people in my 
social groups expect of me. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TB Enable me to feel that the groups I am a part 
of really matter in the big picture. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TB Enable me to feel the groups I belong to have 
a mission to fulfill 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TB Enable me to make sense of the greater 
reasons for the hardships my social groups 
sometimes face 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TB Create connections between members of my 
social group that go beyond ordinary 
friendship. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CS Enable me to feel like a consistent person. 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CS Enable to me feel that I am a reliable person. 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CS Help me figure out how I feel about my own 
actions. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CS Enable me to know where I stand in society 
compared to others. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TS Give me a great sense of personal purpose. 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TS Make me feel like I really matter in the grand 
scheme of things. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TS Make me feel that there is a special reason 
behind my life. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TS Make me feel that my individual actions have 
a reason bigger than I can understand. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CI Enable me to understand what happens when 
I die. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CI Help me feel less frightened about dying. 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CI Enable me to feel the process of death 
follows a predictable structure. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
CI Enable me to understand the process of 
dying. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TI Help me feel that my good deeds in life with 
live on after I die. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TI Make me to feel that my beliefs will carry on 
through future generations. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TI Make me feel that I have made a difference. 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
TI Make me feel that I will be remembered after 
I pass on. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Note: The first column contains a code, the first letter indicating which dimension 
of meaning (coherence = C, transcendence = T), the second letter indicating 
(which component of meaning the item captures (C = certainty, B = belonging, S 
= self-esteem, I = symbolic immortality). This code will not be shown to 
participants
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Appendix D 
Manipulation Checks for Conventional and Moral Standards Prompts 
 
Conventional Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the following 
questions about the conventions you just wrote about using the scales provided. 
 
Moral Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the following questions 
about the morals you just wrote about using the scales provided. 
 
 
1          2          3          4         5          6          7 
                     totally disagree                                                totally agree 
I think that other people should follow 
the morals/conventions I just wrote about 
in all situations. 
 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The morals/conventions I just wrote 
about are no more important than any of 
my other beliefs. 
 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The morals/conventions I just wrote 
about are sacred to me. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Even if it were against the law, I would 
follow the morals/conventions I just 
wrote about. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
The morals/conventions I just wrote 
about represent what I think is absolutely 
right or wrong. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
There is nothing special about the 
morals/conventions I just wrote about 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
I would be willing to change the 
morals/conventions that I just wrote 
about if I was in a situation in which 
other people wanted me to. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
When people violate the 
morals/conventions I just wrote about I 
do not usually get angry with them. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
When people violate the 
morals/conventions I just wrote about I 
am disgusted with them. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
I feel that the morals/conventions I just 
wrote about are sacred. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
I would change the morals/conventions I 
just wrote about if I were in another 
country where people have different 
beliefs 
 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
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Appendix E 
Behavior Identification Form 
 
Any behavior can be described in many ways.  For example, one person 
might describe a behavior as "writing a paper," while another person might 
describe the same behavior as "pushing keys on the keyboard."  Yet another 
person might describe it as "expressing thoughts."  This form focuses on your 
personal preferences for how a number of different behaviors should be 
described.  Below you will find several behaviors listed.  After each behavior will 
be two different ways in which the behavior might be identified.  For example: 
 
1.  Attending class 
a.  sitting in a chair  
b.  looking at a teacher 
 
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the 
behavior for you.  Simply place a checkmark next to the option you prefer.  Be 
sure to respond to every item.  Please mark only one alternative for each 
pair.  Remember, mark the description that you personally believe is more 
appropriate for each pair.  
 
Making a list a. Getting organized 
b. Writing things down 
Reading a. Following lines of print 
b. Gaining knowledge 
Joining the army a. Helping the nations defense 
b. Signing up 
Washing clothes a. Removing odors from clothes 
b. Putting clothes into the machine 
Picking an apple a. Getting something to eat 
b. Pulling an apple of a branch 
Chopping down a tree a. Wielding an axe 
b. Getting firewood 
Measuring a room for carpeting a. Getting ready to remodel 
b. Using a yard stick 
Cleaning the house a. Showing one’s cleanliness 
b. Vacuuming the floor 
Painting a room a. Applying brush strokes 
b. Making the room look fresh 
Paying the rent a. Maintaining a place to live 
b. Writing a check 
Caring for houseplants a. Watering plants 
b. Making the room look nice 
Locking a door a. Putting a key in the lock 
b. Securing the house 
Voting a. Influencing the election 
b. Marking a ballot Voting a Influe cing the election 
b. Marking a ballot 
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Climbing a tree a. Getting a good view 
b. B.holding onto brances 
c. Holding on to branches 
Filling out a personality test a. Answering questions 
b. Revealing what you’re like 
Toothbrushing a. Preventing tooth decay 
b. Moving a brush around in one’s 
mouth 
Taking a test a. Answering questions 
b. Showing one’s knowledge  
Greeting someone a. Saying hello 
b. Showing friendliness 
Resisting temptation a. Saying “no” 
b. Showing moral courage 
Eating a. Getting nutrition 
b. Chewing and swallowing 
Growing a garden a. Planting seeds 
b. Getting fresh vegetables 
Traveling by car a. Following a map 
b. Seeing countryside 
Having a cavity filled a. Protecting your teeth 
b. Going to the dentist 
Talking to a child a. Teaching a child something 
b. Using simple words 
Pushing a doorbell a. Moving a finger 
b. Seeing if someone’s home 
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Appendix F. 
Shortened Need for Closure Scale 
 
1                  2               3               4                5                6                7 
       strongly disagree                                                                                 strongly agree 
1 I believe that orderliness and organization 
are among the most important 
characteristics of a good student. 
 
 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4 When considering most conflict 
situations, I can usually see how both sides 
could be right.  
 
 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2 I don't like to be with people who are 
capable of unexpected actions.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2 I prefer to socialize with familiar friends 
because I know what to expect from them.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
1 I think that I would learn best in a class 
that lacks clearly stated objectives and 
requirements.  
 
 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4 When thinking about a problem, I 
consider as many different opinions on the 
issue as possible.  
 
 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3 I like to know what people are thinking all 
the time.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3 I dislike it when a person's statement 
could mean many different things.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3 It's annoying to listen to someone who 
cannot seem to make up his or her mind.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
1 I find that establishing a consistent routine 
enables me to enjoy life more.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
1 I enjoy having a clear and structured 
mode of life.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4 I prefer interacting with people whose 
opinions are very different from my own.   
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
1 I like to have a place for everything and 
everything in its place.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3 I feel uncomfortable when someone's 
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meaning or intention is unclear to me. 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4 I always see many possible solutions to 
problems I face.   
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3 I'd rather know bad news than stay in a 
state of uncertainty.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4 I do not usually consult many different 
opinions before forming my own view.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2 I dislike unpredictable situations. 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
1 I dislike the routine aspects of my work 
(studies).   
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
Note: Column A indicates the facet scales: 1 = order, 2 = predictability, 3 = 
ambiguity, 4 = open-mindedness. 
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Appendix G 
Sense of Coherence SOC 
 
Here is a series of questions relating to various aspects of your life. Each question 
has seven possible answers. Please mark the number, which expresses your 
answer, with number 1 and 7 being the extreme answers. If the words under 1 are 
right for you, circle 1: if the words under 7 are right for you, circle 7. If you feel 
differently, circle the number which best expresses your feeling. Please give only 
one answer to each question. 
 
*Do you have feelings that you don’t 
really care about what goes on around 
you? 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
very seldom                           very often  
   or never 
Has it happened in the past that you 
were surprised by the behavior of 
people whom you thought you knew 
well?  
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
      never                                          always  
 happened                                     happened 
Has it happened that people whom you 
counted on disappointed you? 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
      never                                           always  
 happened                                     happened 
*Until now your life has had:  1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
     No clear                                 Very  clear 
     goals or                                    goals and 
     purpose at                                purpose   
     all 
Do you have the feeling that you are 
being treated unfairly? 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
      very                                             very           
     often                                            seldom 
                                                        or never 
Do you have the feeling that you are in 
an unfamiliar situation and don’t know 
what to do? 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
      very                                             very           
     often                                          seldom 
                                                       or never 
Doing the thing that you do every day 
is: 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
    a source                                a source of        
 of deep pleasure                        pain and    
 and satisfaction                         boredom 
 
Do you have very mixed-up feelings 
and ideas? 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
       very                                             very           
     often                                            seldom 
                                                       or never 
Does it happen that you have feelings 
inside you that you would rather not 
feel? 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7    
      very                                                 very           
     often                                             seldom 
                                                        or never  
Many people – even those with a strong 
character – sometimes feel like sad 
sacks (losers) in certain situations. How 
often have you felt this way in the past? 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
     never                                             very                                              
                                                            often 
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When something happened, have you 
generally found that: 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
        you                                         you saw 
overestimated                              things in 
          or                                        the right 
 underestimated                          proportion 
          its  
  importance 
*How often do you have the feeling 
that there’s little meaning in the things 
you do in your daily life? 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
      very                                                 very           
     often                                             seldom 
                                                        or never 
How often do you have feelings that 
you’re not sure you can keep under 
control? 
1       2       3       4       5      6       7 
      very                                                 very           
     often                                             seldom 
                                                        or never 
Note: Items marked with an asterisk are expected to measure transcendence. 
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Appendix H 
 
Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ) 
 
 
Absolutely      Mostly       Somewhat      Can’t Say      Somewhat      Mostly     Absolutely 
   Untrue         Untrue          Untrue       True or False       True             True           True 
        1                  2                  3                      4                    5                  6                 7 
 
 
I understand my life’s meaning. 1          2          3         4          5          6          7      
My life has a clear sense of 
purpose. 
1          2          3         4          5          6          7  
I have a good sense of what 
makes my life meaningful. 
1          2          3         4          5          6          7  
I have discovered a satisfying 
life purpose. 
1          2          3         4          5          6          7  
My life has no clear purpose 1          2          3         4          5          6          7  
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Appendix I 
Demographics 
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. Choose the best answer. 
 
1. What is your sex?  Male  /   Female   /  Other__________ 
 
2. What is your ethnicity? 
 <1> African-American/Black     
 <2> White/European American     
 <3> Middle Eastern/Middle Eastern American 
 <4> Asian/Asian-American 
 <5> Latino/a 
 <6> Multiracial/Other (please specify)__________________ 
 
3. Were you born in the United States?    Yes  /   No 
  
4. Approximately, what is your FAMILY’s annual income? 
 
 <1> Under $20,000  <6> $100,000 to $119,999 
 <2> $20,000 to $39,999  <7> $120,000 to $139,999 
 <3> $40,000 to $59,999  <8> $140,000 to $159,999 
 <4> $60,000 to $79,999  <9> $160,000 to $179,999 
 <5> $80,000 to $99,999  <10> $180,000 and over 
 
5. What is your age? ________ years old 
 
6. When it comes to economic policy do you usually consider yourself a liberal, moderate, or 
conservative? 
 
 1   2  3  4  5  6  7 
     strong        liberal        leaning      moderate        leaning       conservative     strong 
     liberal          liberal       conservative    conservative 
 
7. When it comes to social policy do you usually consider yourself a liberal, moderate or 
conservative? 
 
 1   2  3  4  5  6  7 
     strong        liberal        leaning      moderate        leaning       conservative     strong 
     liberal          liberal       conservative    conservative 
 
8. What is your current class standing? 
  
 <1> Freshman  <4> Senior 
 <2> Sophomore  <5> Graduate 
 <3> Junior   <6> Other (please specify)__________________ 
  
9. When it comes to religion, do you consider yourself: 
 
 <1> Christian (e.g. Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, non-denominational, etc.) 
 <2> Buddhist 
 <3> Muslim 
 <4> Hindu 
 <5> Jewish 
 <6> Atheist 
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Appendix J 
NAVON 
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Appendix K 
Threat Prompts 
 
Coherence Threat Prompt 
 
The current study assesses personality traits that have been shown to relate 
to the type of life a person will have, and how these traits relate to social behavior. 
What follows is a commonly used psychological inventory called the Goal 
Achievement Probability Inventory (GAP). This inventory has been used by 
social psychologists at major universities like Princeton and Yale and strongly 
predicts life outcomes across many dimensions. We are specifically examining 
the probability that people’s lives will be secure, organized, and predictable, 
compared to the lives of others. Please respond to the specific GAP Inventory 
questions included in this study as honestly and accurately as possible.  
Because the results of this inventory may be useful in life planning, the 
university has required us to share your results with you. These results are based 
on a series of complicated algorithms and condense a large amount of information 
about you into interpretable indices. After you complete the GAP inventory, you 
will receive your results generated by the GAP algorithms in the three dimensions 
of security, organization and predictability described above. Please pay careful 
attention to your results, as we will be asking you about what kind of life you 
intend to lead based on these results later. After you view your results you will be 
given the opportunity to choose one of two short training modules about life 
planning that you will complete after the study.  
When you are ready to complete the GAP Inventory, please click the 
forward arrow at the bottom of the screen.  
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Transcendence Threat Prompt 
 
The current study assesses personality traits that have been shown to relate 
to the type of life a person will have, and how these traits relate to social behavior. 
What follows is a commonly used psychological inventory called the Goal 
Achievement Probability Inventory (GAP). This inventory has been used by 
social psychologists at major universities like Princeton and Yale and strongly 
predicts life outcomes across many dimensions. We are specifically examining 
the probability that people’s lives will be fulfilling, purposeful, and engaging, 
compared to the lives of others. Please respond to the specific GAP Inventory 
questions included in this study as honestly and accurately as possible.  
Because the results of this inventory may be useful in life planning, the 
university has required us to share your results with you. These results are based 
on a series of complicated algorithms and condense a large amount of information 
about you into interpretable indices. After you complete the GAP inventory, you 
will receive the results generated by the GAP algorithms in the three dimensions 
of fulfillment, purpose, and engagement. Please pay careful attention to your 
results, as we will be asking you about what kind of life you intend to lead based 
on these results later. After you view your results you will be given the 
opportunity to choose one of two short training modules about life planning that 
you will complete after the study.  
When you are ready to complete the GAP Inventory, please click the 
forward arrow at the bottom of the screen.
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Appendix L 
Threat Feedback From GAP 
 
Coherence Threat Feedback 
 
Goal Achievement Probability (GAP) Results 
 
The results of your GAP inventory are displayed below in the form of a bar chart. 
There are two different colored bars in the chart. The black bars represent the 
probability that you will live a life characterized by each of the three traits listed 
on the left side of the screen that were measured in your GAP inventory. The grey 
bars represent the probability that a person selected randomly from the general 
population has of living a life characterized by these same three traits. All 
probabilities are out of 100%, and can be assessed by comparing the location of 
the bars with the percent scale below the chart. For example, if you or someone in 
the general population had a rating of 75 for organization, it would mean that you 
have a 75% chance of living an organized life. A key is also included above the 
chart to remind you of which bars represent yourself and which bars represent the 
general population. 
 
 
 
 
0 25 50 75 100 
Predictability 
Organization 
Security 
Your Projected Life Outcomes (In Percentages) 
You General Population 
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Transcendence Threat Feedback 
 
Goal Achievement Probability (GAP) Results 
 
The results of your GAP inventory are displayed below in the form of a bar chart. 
There are two different colored bars in the chart. The black bars represents the 
probability that you will live a life characterized by each of the three traits listed 
on the left side of the screen that were measured in your GAP inventory. The grey 
bars represents the probability that a person selected randomly from the general 
population has of living a life characterized by these same three traits. All 
probabilities are out of 100%, and can be assessed by comparing the location of 
the bars with the percent scale below the chart. For example, if you or someone in 
the general population had a rating of 75 for purpose, it would mean that you have 
a 75% chance of living an organized life. A key is also included above the chart to 
remind you of which bars represent yourself and which bars represent the general 
population. 
 
 
 
 
0 25 50 75 100 
Fufillment 
Purpose 
Engagement 
Your Projected Life Outcomes (In Percentages) 
You General Population 
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Neutral Coherence Feedback 
 
Goal Achievement Probability (GAP) Results 
 
The results of your GAP inventory are displayed below in the form of a bar chart. 
There are two different colored bars in the chart. The black bars represents the 
probability that you will live a life characterized by each of the three traits listed 
on the left side of the screen that were measured in your GAP inventory. The grey 
bars represents the probability that a person selected randomly from the general 
population has of living a life characterized by these same three traits. All 
probabilities are out of 100%, and can be assessed by comparing the location of 
the bars with the percent scale below the chart. For example, if you or someone in 
the general population had a rating of 75 for organization, it would mean that you 
have a 75% chance of living an organized life. A key is also included above the 
chart to remind you of which bars represent yourself and which bars represent the 
general population. 
 
 
0 25 50 75 100 
Predictability 
Organization 
Security 
Your Projected Life Outcomes (In Percentages) 
You General Population 
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Neutral Transcendence Feedback 
 
Goal Achievement Probability (GAP) Results 
 
The results of your GAP inventory are displayed below in the form of a bar chart. 
There are two different colored bars in the chart. The black bars represents the 
probability that you will live a life characterized by each of the three traits listed 
on the left side of the screen that were measured in your GAP inventory. The grey 
bars represents the probability that a person selected randomly from the general 
population has of living a life characterized by these same three traits. All 
probabilities are out of 100%, and can be assessed by comparing the location of 
the bars with the percent scale below the chart. For example, if you or someone in 
the general population had a rating of 75 for purpose, it would mean that you have 
a 75% chance of living an organized life. A key is also included above the chart to 
remind you of which bars represent yourself and which bars represent the general 
population. 
 
0 25 50 75 100 
Fufillment 
Purpose 
Engagement 
Your Projected Life Outcomes (In Percentages) 
You General Population 
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Appendix M 
Study 3 Manipulation Check 
 
Coherence Threat Condition 
 
We would not like to see how well you understood your GAP scores. Please 
indicate, to the best of your memory, your GAP scores on the sliding scales below. 
The sliding scales represent your likelihood of having a life characterized by 
security, organization, and predictability compared to the population average. 
Please move the slider on each line to match your results on the GAP as closely as 
possible.  
 
Security          ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  0  25  50  75  100 
 
Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the 
general population? 
 
Below Average                                              Average                                          
Above Average    
 
Organization  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  0  25  50  75  100 
 
Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the 
general population? 
 
Below Average                                              Average                                          
Above Average    
 
Predictability---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  0  25  50  75  100 
 
Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the 
general population? 
 
Below Average                                              Average                                          
Above Average    
 
1                  2               3               4                5                6                7 
       not at all                                                                                     to a great extent 
To what extent do you feel safe in your 
day-to-day life? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How predictable is your day-to-day life? 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How organized is your life right now? 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How engaging is your life right now? 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
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How purposeful do you feel in your 
day-to-day life? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How fulfilled do you feel in your life 
right now? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How safe do you think you will be in 
your life overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How predictable do you think your life 
will be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How organized do you think your life 
will be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How engaging do you think your life 
will be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How purposeful do you think your life 
will be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
On a day-to-day basis, how happy are 
you? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
On a day-to day basis, how sad are you? 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
On a day-to-day basis, how excited are 
you? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
On a day-to day basis, how anxious are 
you? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How happy do you think you will be 
about your life overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How sad do you think you will be in 
your life overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How exciting do you think your life will 
be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How anxious do you think you will be 
in your life overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
 
 
Transcendence Threat Condition 
 
Below are three sliding scales representing your likelihood of having a secure, 
organized, and predictable life. The sliding scales represent your likelihood of 
having a life characterized by security, organization, and predictability compared 
to the population average. Please move the slider on each line to match your 
results on the GAP as closely as possible.  
 
Engagement ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  0  25  50  75  100 
 
Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the 
general population? 
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Below Average                                              Average                                          
Above Average    
 
Purpose ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  0  25  50  75  100 
 
Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the 
general population? 
 
Below Average                                              Average                                          
Above Average    
 
Fufillment---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  0  25  50  75  100 
 
Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the 
general population? 
 
Below Average                                              Average                                          
Above Average    
 
 
 
 
 
1                  2               3               4                5                6                7 
       not at all                                                                                     to a great extent 
To what extent do you feel safe in your 
day-to-day life? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How predictable is your day-to-day life? 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How organized is your life right now? 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How engaging is your life right now? 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How purposeful do you feel in your 
day-to-day life? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How fulfilled do you feel in your life 
right now? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How safe do you think you will be in 
your life overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How predictable do you think your life 
will be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How organized do you think your life 
will be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How engaging do you think your life 
will be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How purposeful do you think your life 
will be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
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On a day-to-day basis, how happy are 
you? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
On a day-to day basis, how sad are you? 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
On a day-to-day basis, how excited are 
you? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
On a day-to day basis, how anxious are 
you? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How happy do you think you will be 
about your life overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How sad do you think you will be in 
your life overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How exciting do you think your life will 
be overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
How anxious do you think you will be 
in your life overall? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
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Appendix N 
Moral and Conventional Importance Measure for Study 3 
 
What follows is a series of statements about what is important to you in life. 
Using the scales provided below, please rate the extent to which the behaviors 
described in each statement are important to you. 
 
1                  2               3               4                5                6                7 
       strongly disagree                                                                                 strongly agree 
C1: It is important to me to follow the 
conventions of society.   
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
M1: It is more important to me do what I 
feel is right than to be do what society 
expects of me. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
C2: I think I should follow family tradition 
when making life decisions.  
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
M2: My moral beliefs should play a large 
role in guiding my life choices.  
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
M3: Being trustworthy is a high priority for 
me. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
C3: Regardless of what I think is right, I 
feel I should try to do what is socially 
expected of me. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
M4: It is important to spend a lot of time 
trying hard not to harm others. 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
C4: Fitting in with social norms, like 
wearing acceptable clothing to social 
events, is important to me 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
M5: If I think something goes against my 
moral beliefs, I would not do it, even if it 
breaks the rules. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
C5(R): My family’s customs are not very 
important to me.  
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
C6: It is important that people behave based 
on common behavioral guidelines, like 
putting a napkin in one’s lap, or not talking 
on a cell phone on public transit. 
 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
M6: Doing what I feel is right is more 
important to me than doing what society 
considers normal. 
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
C7: The customs I follow in day-to-day life 
give me a strong sense of satisfaction.  
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
C8(R): It is not important to me to do what 
is considered normal in most situations.  
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1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
M7(R): I am not very concerned about 
issues that are related to my sense of right 
and wrong.  
 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Note: Items marked with a C represent convention and items marked with an M 
represent Morality. Items marked with a (R) were reverse coded. 
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Appendix O 
Search for Meaning 
 
Absolutely      Mostly       Somewhat      Can’t Say      Somewhat      Mostly     Absolutely 
   Untrue         Untrue          Untrue       True or False       True             True           True 
        1                  2                  3                      4                    5                  6                 7 
 
I am looking for something that makes 
my life feel meaningful. 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
I am always looking to find my life’s 
purpose. 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
I am always searching for something 
that makes my life feel significant. 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
I am seeking a purpose or mission for 
my life 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
I am searching for meaning in my life. 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
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Appendix P 
Indirect Measure of Desire for Coherence and Transcendence 
 
Now that you have received your GAP results, please select which of the two 
training modules below you would like to complete today after the main part of 
the study is finished. Each training module is a short series of exercises that you 
will complete after the main portion of the study that teach you how to achieve 
the goals of leading an organized and well-planned life, or a life characterized by 
purpose and meaning. 
 
Module 1: Organization and Planning 
This module teaches organization and life planning skills. The goal of this 
training module is to impart you with knowledge that will make your life more 
organized and predictable. 
 
Module 2: Purpose and Meaning 
This module teaches strategies you can use to feel more meaningful in life. The 
goal of this training module is to impart you with knowledge you can use to make 
your life feel more meaningful and purposeful.  
 
 
